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ABSTRACT
The end of the Cold War has been the watershed event for changes in the international and na-
tional security environments that present tremendous implications for the US submarine force.
These changes include calls for significant US defense cuts to reap a "peace dividend," the in-
creasing importance of economics as a determinant of defense spending, and the disintegration of
the Soviet Union resulting in the absence of a clear tangible global threat to US national interests.
What has resulted from these changes is the formulation of a new US national security strategy
that focuses on regional contingencies, and the decision to cut US defense forces by at least 25%
over five years including the cancellation of the Seawolf submarine program. This thesis ad-
dresses the implications of these tremendous changes on the US submarine force. Specifically, is-
sues that are addressed include roles and missions, force structure, submarine design, and
changing the institutional mindset of the submarine community. The issue of roles and missions
involves demonstrating the applicability of the submarine to regional warfare. The issue oi sub-
marine force structure deals with both the short term and long term factors affecting submarine
force reductions and ultimate submarine force size. The issue of submarine design addresses
concerns over the submarine industrial base, the Centurion program, and design requirements for
a regional warfighting submarine. The need to change tine institutional mindset of the submarine
community is addressed to illuminate the fact that in order to adapt to and absorb the enormous
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The end of the Cold War has been the watershed event for changes in the
international and national security environments that present tremendous
implications for the US submarine force. These changes include calls for
significant US defense cuts to reap a "peace dividend," the increasing importance
of economics as a determinant of defense spending, and the disintegration of the
Soviet Union resulting in the absence of a clear tangible global threat to US
national interests. What has resulted from these changes is the formulation of a
new US national security strategy that focuses on regional contingencies, and the
decision to cut US defense forces by at least 25% over five years including the
cancellation of the Seawolf submarine program. This thesis addresses the
implications of these tremendous changes on the US submarine force.
Specifically, issues that are addressed include roles and missions, force structure,
submarine design, and changing the institutional mindset of the submarine
community.
The issue of roles and missions involves demonstrating the applicability of
the submarine to the new regional defense strategy. The submarine does have a
role in all four foundations of this strategy: forward presence, crisis response,
strategic deterrence and defense, and reconstitution. With the exception of
deterrence, these roles and missions involve primarily regional warfare or
deterring a future emergent global threat. The submarine is a significant
contributor to the new regional defense strategy. It provides unique and
multiple mission capabilities to US regional warfighting forces.
The issue of submarine force structure deals with the short term and long
term factors affecting submarine force reductions, ultimate submarine force size
vm
and the future utilization of submarines in support oi the regional defense
strategy- The short term factors are primarily economic and political, and affect
the rate of reduction or glide slope of submarine force level reductions. These
factors include the large costs associated with retiring nuclear submarines
compared to their operating costs, the need for maintaining the viability of the
submarine industrial base, and the stability of the international environment in
allowing further cuts in US defense capability. The long term factors affect the
ultimate size of the regional defense submarine force. The primary factors in the
long term will be the submarine industrial base that will set the minimum for the
force, Navy and unified CINC requirements that will set the maximum for the
force, and federal and defense budget constraints that will tend to limit the size
of the force. Submarine organization in the future must be transformed in order
to fully exploit the potential of the submarine in joint integrated operations while
at the same time maintaining the ability to operate independently. This will
require the integration of submarines into the surface community's cruiser-
destroyer group organizations to support joint operations, while at the same time
organizing the remaining submarines into strike squadrons that will assume the
independent roles and missions of the submarine force.
The issue of submarine design addresses concerns over the submarine
industrial base, the Centurion program, and design requirements for a regional
warfighting submarine. The primary short term factor affecting submarine
design will be maintaining the submarine industrial base. This will require a
dependence on previous designs to ensure an affordable and effective Centurion
program. Related to this is the need to concentrate submarine designs on
affordability. Other short term factors include the need to begin the transition of
IX
submarine design to a regional warfighting emphasis, and concern over sending
the wrong signal to the Russian military by continuing to build submarines
designed against them. In the long term, the primary factor affecting submarine
design will be the need for a comprehensive assessment of requirements for a
regional warfighting submarine. This assessment should include propulsion,
weapons capability, sensors and electronics, and platform requirements. In
addition to designing for a regional warfighting submarine there will remain a
requirement in the future to retain submarine design flexibility to respond to
rapid changes in the international environment.
The need to change the institutional mindset of the submarine community is
addressed in order to illuminate the fact that in order to adapt to and absorb the
enormous changes occurring in the international environment, the submarine
community must change as well. These changes include changing the frame of
reference of the community, shedding the traditional shroud of secrecy
surrounding submarine operations and capabilities, and engaging the Congress
in the decision making processes of the submarine force from the outset.
It is vital that the leaders of the submarine community develop a long term
vision that encompasses and addresses these issues and sets the proper course
for the submarine force in its transition from a Cold War posture to a regional
defense posture. This vision of the future is already well on the way to being
articulated and implemented by the leaders of the submarine community. It is
important that the submarine community embrace this sudden and dramatic
transformation rather than resist it. The choice is clear. The submarine force can
be the major determinant of its own future, or else it can resist change and let
others determine the path of the submarine force of the future.
I. THE FUTURE IS NOW
A. INTRODUCTION
The Cold War is over and suddenly the United States finds itself facing
fundamental questions concerning its role in the new world order. Finding
answers to these complex questions is made all the more difficult by a domestic
environment that is increasingly pressing for change. This pressure is resulting
from concerns about the US economy and in calls for the reaping of a "peace
dividend" following the end of the Cold War. The fact that this debate is
occurring during a presidential election year tends to make the pressure even
more intense. The outcome of this debate will have serious implications for the
US military.
J
The US military was not immune from economic or political considerations
even during the Cold War. Issues related to national defense were common
foundations of presidential campaigns, including the purported "missile gap"
during the 1960 campaign and the issue of US military weaknesses during the
1980 campaign. 1 In the past there was a common underlying factor; that of the
threat of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union provided comfortable boundaries
for all debates concerning US national security and military strategies. The
military directed virtually all of its efforts towards countering the Soviet threat.
The strategy of containment, as developed in the late 1940s, was clearly necessary
-'For further discussion of the impact of political campaigns on defense decisions see
Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy
Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Strobe Talbott, Deadly
Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York and
Toronto: Random House, 1985).
during the Cold War.'- Now that the Cold War is over, however, the
combination of the prolonged consistency of the threat and the subsequent
exclusive focus of the nation has produced undesired effects. The public,
conditioned for generations to justify military expenditures in terms of the Soviet
threat, is now questioning the purpose of the decidedly large US military
establishment.
Today, the Soviet Union has collapsed under the weight of its own economic
troubles. The former members of the Warsaw Pact are struggling to rebuild their
societies based on democratic and free market systems. The last bastions of
communism are focusing their attention inward in their attempts to stem
growing desires for freedom and prosperity. The world has become devoid of a
tangible, easily recognizable threat to American ideals.
The United States government has reacted to the changing events
throughout the world, as well as to the concerns of its people, by proposing a
new regional defense strategy. 3 This strategy recognizes the decline of what
remains of the Soviet Union as a threat and the emergence of regional crises as
the new focus of US national security concerns. As a result of the reduced threat,
the new strategy also proposes to decrease the size of the military by 25-30%.
Each military service faces tough decisions concerning its contribution in the
post-Cold War world. Included in these decisions is the applicability of weapon
^See National Security Council, The Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense on 'United
States Objectives and Programsfor National Security,' April 7, 1950 (NSC-68) (Washington, DC.
: GPO, 1950); and Mr. X (George F. Kennan), "Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25
(July 1947): 572-82.
^See President, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC. : GPO,
1991). For the purposes of this thesis, the term "regional defense strategy" is synonymous
with "new national security strategy."
systems which were designed for the Cold War context to the threats of regional
contingencies. The US attack submarine is an excellent example of a weapon
system strongly associated with a Cold War mission.4 The US Navy is now
facing fundamental questions involving the future of the submarine in this new
international security environment.
How, then, does the submarine fit into this new international security
environment? The major issues that must be addressed to answer this question
involve future roles and missions, force structure considerations, future design
requirements, and justification of the program. It is important to note that these
issues are not unique to the submarine force. In fact, every service is currently
evaluating its own weapons systems to determine their roles in the new world
order. This thesis, by concentrating on the submarine force, should not be
misinterpreted as advocating the submarine over other weapons systems. The
approach used in this research instead has been to determine the contributions of
the submarine to the ability of the US armed forces to defend and promote
national security interests. Thus, this thesis can be seen as one element of the
strategic planning process, that theoretically starts with the enunciation of
national security interests, leads to the development of a national military
strategy, and then progresses to the determination of individual elements of that
strategy and associated force structure. Needless to say, with the dust still
settling on the end of the Cold War, the strategic planning process for the future
of US armed forces is very dynamic and far from complete.
^For an example of the debate that occurred over the Seawolf program, see James J.
Kilpatrick, "Seawolf Sub: A S2 Billion Baby the Navy doesn't need," Norfolk Virginian-Pilot,
12 September 1991. (Reprinted in its entirety in The Submarine Review, (October 1991): 17-22.)
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to provide some general insight
into the current state of the development of US national security strategy since
the end of the Cold War. This chapter first looks at the sources of change in the
international system which are driving the need to transform the military. What
has not changed, i.e. the sources of continuity, in the international system are
then addressed. The fundamental concepts of the regional defense strategy are
presented to provide the strategic context for discussing the submarine's role,
including a description of the National Military Strategy and the Navy's. . . From
The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century* Given this background,
the thesis then explores the most pressing issues facing the US submarine force in
this new international security environment.
B. SOURCES OF CHANGE
The most obvious change in the international system has been the end of the
Cold War. What exactly does that mean? On a large scale, the Cold War was a
conflict of ideologies. Unresolvable ideological differences were the source of the
military, political, and economic tensions that were evident for forty-five years.
These tensions led ultimately to the creation and maintenance of powerful
arsenals capable of tremendous destruction. Today with the collapse of
communism in the former Soviet Union, the source of the Cold War has faded if
not disappeared.
The end of the Cold War has resulted in a change of focus in terms of United
States national security. We now concern ourselves less with a global adversary
-'General Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy 1992 (Washington D.C. : GPO,
January 1992); and Department of the Navy, . . . From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Servicefor
the 21st Century (Washington, D.C: US Department of the Navy, 30 September 1992).
capable of destroying our country and more with lesser adversaries capable in
the near term of threatening our regional national interests and in the long term
of threatening the United States itself. All the while the United States must keep
a wary eye on the international environment to ensure that we can maintain our
security in the face of an emergent or remilitarized global threat.
Another effect of the end of the Cold War has been to raise the importance of
concerns that were previously secondary. 6 Economics has always been a
constraint upon military expenditures. Now, however, the domestic issues of a
growing budget deficit and a persistent recession are becoming more important,
especially due to election year politics. The result has been that economics is
becoming more of a determinant of defense spending rather than a constraint/
Related to the issue of economics and the end of the Cold War is the issue of
forward military basing. Now that the primary threat has abated and with
budgetary funds becoming increasingly scarce, the need for these bases is being
called into question. As a result, the United States is in the process of reducing or
eliminating many of its foreign bases.8 The future role of the United States in
this new world order is still the subject of considerable debate, as evidenced by
the discussion that resulted from leaks of the drafts of the past year's Defense
"See "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs oi Staff, to the
Washington Chapter of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association
(AFCEA) -- The Shoreham Hotel, 14 December 1990," as delivered, 29 pp.
'For an example of defense decisions based on economic determinants see William W.
Kaufmann and John D. Steinbruner, Decisionsfor Defense: Prospects for a New Order
(Washington, D.C : The Brookings Institution, 1991); and William W. Kaufmann, A
Thoroughly Efficient Navy (Washington, D.C. : The Brookings Institution, 1987). For the effect
of economic constraints on the Navy in particular see Harlan K. Ullman, In Harm 's Way:
American Seapower and the 21st Century (Silver Springs, MD: Bartleby Press, 1991).
"See "Pentagon Adds 83 Bases to Europe Cutbacks: Military Speeds up Reductions
Following End of Cold War," Washington Post, 31 January 1992, p. 6(A).
Planning Guidance. 9 In the short term it appears that US political commitments
will be largely unchanged. If this continues in the long run, then the United
States, by reducing overseas bases, is depriving itself of a means of influencing
international events. A possible result of this is that there will be an increasing
reliance on naval forces to influence events abroad.
On the military level, what has been the effect of the end of the Cold War?
The National Militan/ Strategy describes this rather clearly. 10 It calls for reduced
armed forces capable of meeting the military requirements of the new regional
defense strategy. These forces will be capable of supporting the four pillars of
the strategy, namely: deterrence and strategic defense, crisis response, forward
presence, and reconstitution.il
From the perspective of the Navy, many of its global commitments currently
remain unchanged, yet they will meet these commitments with fewer ships and
personnel. What had been the goal of 600 ships is now7 450 and even that may be
wishful thinking.^ 2 -pne Maritime Strategy, which focused on global
conventional conflict with the Soviet Union, is now on the shelf in the event of a
^See "Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to Fight in Post-Cold War Era: Plans for
Hypothetical Conflicts and Big Budgets," New York Times, 17 February 1992, p. 1(A); and
Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York Tunes, 9
March 1992, p. 1(L).
^National Military Strategy 1992, 1.
-*--4bid., preface.
^The Congressional Budget Office has projected future navy strength at 310 ships based
on current programming, see Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Statement of Robert F.
Hale, Assistant Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office, Before the
Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Committee on Armed Services, United
States Senate (Washington, DC: CBO, 1991); Harlan Ullman predicts a force of 300 ships by
the year 2000, see In Harm's Way, 184.
resurgent global threat. 13 What has emerged in its place is . . . From The Sea:
Preparing the Nazwl Service for the 21st Century, that places a renewed emphasis on
crisis response and forward presence in order to focus on the more likely threat
of regional conflict. -^ The Navy, like its fellow services, is grappling with the
need to reduce expenditures. The Seawolf class submarine program appears to be
one of many victims of this desire to cut costs. 1 -
In summary, the end of the Cold War has been the watershed event for the
dramatic reshaping of both the national and international environments. It has
required the United States to shift its focus from a global perspective based on
containment of communism to a concern over regional contingencies. As a result
of this shift, the US armed forces are undergoing a reduction in force structure
that is requiring tough choices concerning future programming. Making these
decisions more complex is the rise in importance of the economic costs of
maintaining US defense forces. President Bush responded to these international
changes with a new regional defense strategy and General Colin Powell with a
new National Militan/ Strategy that both outline a planned reduction of forces that
will still support our various interests throughout the world. Meanwhile, the
-^H. Lawrence Garrett III, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, and General A. M. Gray. "The
Way Ahead." US Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1991, 38; "the maritime strategy itself
remains on the shelf, with Atlantic and Pacific operations plans as bookends, ready to be
retrieved if a global threat should reemerge."
-^See . . . From The Sea, 1.
-^For further explanation of the budget cuts following the President's State of the Union
address see Department of Defense News Briefing, "DoD Budget Briefing with Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood, General Colin Powell,
Chairman, JCS, Wednesday, January 29, 1992."
individual services are still grappling with tailoring their forces to meet the new
strategy.^"
C. SOURCES OF CONTINUITY
Given that these enormous changes have occurred, what has remained the
same? On the international level, the United States remains deeply involved.
Unlike the situation following World War I, the United States does not seriously
have the option of retreating to its shorelines and focusing its attention only on
itself. The world has become smaller even during the Cold War through
increasing economic and political interdependence. Now with the collapse of
communism, the need for international political cooperation has grown
tremendously due to the need to support and encourage the fledgling
democracies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 1' Thus the political
and economic commitments of the United States have not been reduced with the
end of the Cold War. They have become even larger and more vital. 1°
Concurrently, the need for some form of military forces to support these
commitments has not disappeared. Some have hailed the end of the Cold War as
the end of all sources of conflict. Certainly, the end of the Cold War is the end of
a major source of conflict, but not the end of all sources of conflict. The tensions
between the superpowers inhibited regional conflicts due to the fear of escalation
-'"For an example of the initial efforts of the services to develop a strategy for the post-
Cold War era, see Department of tine Air Force, The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global
Reach - Global Power (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, June 1990).
^National Military Strategy 1992, 1.
^°This is the argument of Richard M. Nixon in Seize the Moment: America's Cliallenge in a
One-Superpower World (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1992).
to global war and nuclear Armageddon. 19 The overbearing concerns oi the
superpower conflict did little to eliminate the sources of regional conflict, only to
prevent them from breaking out or escalating. Now, in this new world order, we
see the removal of the blanketing effect of the Cold War, and the rekindling of
regional conflicts that have been smoldering for the past forty-five years.
Yugoslavia and the Gulf War are but two of a growing number of examples of
post-Cold War regional conflicts. As the National Mihtan/ Strategy points out, the
need for military forces to face these new realities has been reduced but not
eliminated.20
While tremendous changes have been occurring throughout the world, the
United States military has remained a stabilizing source of strength. As our
adversary of the past forty-five years crumbled before our very eyes, our
capability was at its highest levels ever. American military successes
demonstrated this in Operation Desert Storm. We find ourselves in a similar
military situation as we found ourselves after World War II. Because of an
intense military competition we have amassed very large military forces. Now
that the competition is over and our adversary is imploding, we find ourselves in
the enviable position of being the only superpower in the world. Our forces,
which were designed to meet the multiple threats of the Soviet Union, are now
more than adequate to meet the regional threats that we now face.
The challenge to the US military today is to use its enormous advantage in
military capability to allow a significant reduction in forces and not subsequently
^National Military Strategy 1992, 2-4.
-^Ibid., preface; "We can meet the challenges of the foreseeable future with a much
smaller force than we have had in recent years."
put national security interests at unreasonable risk. This challenge invokes
finding ways to meet the demands of the National Military Strategy with weapon
systems previously used only to counter the Soviet threat. At the same time, the
military must formulate design criteria for the next generation of weapons
systems to truly counter the new threat while meeting austere budget
constraints. The role of the submarine is a good example of this challenge. The
nuclear submarine was developed during the Cold War, and its multimission
capability is a direct result of Soviet-American competition. Now with the end of
the Cold War, the Navy must develop a strategy that uses its declining force
structure to meet its considerable commitments, while formulating design
criteria for future submarines that address the requirements of the new
international security environment.
D. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The military element of the National Security Strategy of the United States
builds upon four foundations or "pillars". These foundations are strategic
deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.21
Strategic Deterrence and Defense. The former Soviet Union, despite its
precipitous decline over the last year, still retains the capability to destroy the
United States within hours. Clearly, however, the numbers of former Soviet
nuclear forces are being reduced and may be reduced drastically in the future.
Besides the nuclear weapons that remain in what was once the Soviet Union, an
increasing number of potentially hostile states have developed, or are
^-1-The following discussion is summarized from the National Military Strategy 1992, 6-8;
National Security Strategy of the United States, 25-31; and James J. Tritten, Our New National
Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back (Westport, CT and London: Praeger
Publishers, 1992), 17-26.
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developing, weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them over
long distances.^- This combination of the declining but still potent former-Soviet
threat and the emerging Third World threat, requires that the United States
retain a strong and credible nuclear deterrent and continue to develop means of
defending against nuclear attacks on the United States, our forces overseas, and
our allies. This must be done at the same time that we continue an
unprecedented reduction of our nuclear arsenal.
Forward Presence. In this new era of regional threats the need for forward
presence becomes even more important.23 Yet defense cuts and the closing of
many overseas bases have prompted the Department of Defense to reevaluate
the traditional definitions of forward presence in order for the United States to
continue to fulfill its many obligations.24 Forward presence will continue to be a
cornerstone of US national security policy, yet the challenge of this new era is to
tailor our evolving force structure to allow us to meet our objectives.
Crisis Response. The shift in emphasis from a global war to regional
contingencies has forced the United States to focus on the ability of its forces to
respond quickly and decisively to regional crises. This focus recognizes the
uncertainty of the threat and the short warning periods that may be involved in
^National Military Strategy 1992, 6; William Matthews, "Renegade nations pose future
nuke threat: Aspin," Navy Times, 7 October 1991; and Stan Weeks, "Crafting a New
Maritime Strategy," US Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1992, 32.
•^See National Security Strategy of the United States, "In a world less driven by an
immediate, massive threat to Europe or the danger of global war, the need to support a
smaller but still crucial forward presence and to deal with regional contingencies . . . will shape
how we organize, equip, train, deploy and employ our active and reserve forces. (Emphasis
added)," 25.
^*This is discussed in Tritten's, Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to
Come Back, 25-26.
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future crises. It also understands the reduction in force structure and capability
of US forces.
Reconstitution. This aspect of our strategy was formulated in recognition of
the implausibility of a global confrontation and our declining ability to meet that
threat. In simple terms, reconstitution is necessary because, "we must preserve a
credible capability to forestall any potential adversary from competing militarily
with the United States."25
The National Militant Strategy also discusses a set of Strategic Principles that
are meant to build upon the four foundations discussed previously. Those
principles are: readiness, collective security, arms control, maritime and
aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power projection, technological
superiority, and decisive force. "These principles capitalize on our enduring
strengths, capture the key lessons learned from our victory in Desert Storm, and
allow us to exploit the weaknesses of those who might challenge United States
interests. "2^
. . . From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century builds upon
the foundation provided by the National Militan/ Strategy and addresses the role
of maritime forces in defending US national security interests. It, like the
National Military Strategi/, focuses on regional contingencies. The objectives of
maritime forces, according to . . . From The Sea, is to provide the nation with naval
expeditionary forces that are 1) shaped for joint operations, 2) operating
forward from the sea, and 3) tailored for national needs. 2 '
7 The thrust of these
^National Military Strategy 1992, 7.
26Ibid.,8.
^' See . . . From The Sea, 2.
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objectives is to reinforce the unique contributions of maritime forces to regional
warfare. "In addition to our traditional operational capabilities of forward
deployment, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and sealift, four key
operational capabilities are required to successfully execute the new direction of
the Navy and Marine Corps : Command, Control, and Surveillance; Battlespace
Dominance; Power Projection; and Force Sustainment."2° . . . From The Sea
provides the specific goals and objectives for maritime forces in the post-Cold
War world. The next step of the strategic planning process is to determine the
contribution of the various elements that make up maritime forces. This thesis
will examine the specific contribution of the submarine in this new strategic
framework.
E. DETERMINING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBMARINE
The transition of the submarine force from a Cold War posture to a regional
defense strategy posture is alreadv underway, despite the fact that clear
endpoints are not necessarily developed yet. This thesis examines the factors
affecting both the transition and the final endpoint of the submarine force
concerning the following issues: roles and missions, force structure, and future
submarine design. In addition, this thesis discusses the change of direction that
is necessary in terms of the way the submarine force is viewed both from the
perspective of the military and of the public. The goal of this thesis is to provide
a broad overview of the direction of the submarine force in the future.
28Ibid., 7.
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II. ROLES AND MISSIONS
A. RELATING MEANS TO ENDS
The determination of submarine roles and missions in the post-Cold War
world requires a common strategic framework for the estimation of future US
national interests and defining goals and objectives. As discussed in the
Introduction, this framework has been provided by the National Security Strategy
of the United States (also known as the regional defense strategy ), the National
Military Strategy 1992, and . . . From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Servicefor the 21st
Century * How can the submarine force support and reinforce these foundations
of our national security strategy? First, what does the submarine contribute to
this new strategy? and given that the four "pillars" of the regional defense
strategy are the ends, how can the submarine contribute to the means with which
to achieve them?
B. THE CONTRIBUTING CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES OF
THE NUCLEAR SUBMARINE
The nuclear submarine evolved during the Cold War under design
requirements that sought to counter its toughest challenge, the Soviet nuclear
submarine. The need to defeat the Soviet nuclear submarine required the
development of the capability to operate far forward for extended periods of
•'See President, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C. : GPO,
1991); General Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy 1992 (Washington D.C. : GPO,
January 1992); and Department of the Navy, . . . From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Servicefor
the 21st Century (Washington D.C. : US Department of the Navy, 30 September 1992).
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time, and to respond quickly and flexibly to emergent threats.*- By meeting these
design criteria, the submarine developed the enduring characteristics of stealth,
endurance, and agility.3 In this new era of regional contingencies, the need for
rapid sustained response and multiple mission capability is still paramount, and
the submarine already has the means to meet the new challenge.
Stealth. From the invention of the submarine, one of its primary strengths
has been its ability to conceal itself beneath the surface of the oceans. Nuclear
propulsion enabled the submarine to use stealth not only in specified situations
such as attack, or evasion, but as a permanent regimen from leaving port to just
prior to returning. The technological advances associated with performing the
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission have enabled the submarine to become
virtually undetectable not onlv to the eye and to radar, but to sonar as well. This
ability to operate with stealth provides the United States with a platform that can
operate far forward in enemy waters for a variety of missions, and that retains
significant survivability while doing so. The stealth capability of the submarine
removes any requirement for defensive support, allowing it the ability to operate
independently. The submarine's stealth capability is not threatened by the end
of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has reduced any incentives for
pursuing countermeasures to the submarine threat. The need for solving the
*-For a summary of submarine characteristics, see Norman Friedman, Submarine Design
and Development (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 9-16.
^These characteristics and the discussion that follows are drawn from Department of the
Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare), Submarine Roles in the 1990's
and Beyo7id (Washington, DC: US Department of the Navy, 18 January 1992), 4-6.
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"ASW problem" is no longer a pressing issue to the United States or the Soviet
Union.4
Endurance. Nuclear power provides the submarine with the ability to
conduct sustained operations in any part of the world's oceans without the need
for logistical support. This ability to operate without support contributes to the
submarine's operational independence.
Agility. The term agility refers to the submarine's unique blend of stealth,
endurance, speed, multimission capability, readiness, and command, control and
communications (C^) capability. This combination provides the operational
commander with a flexible weapons platform capable of responding rapidly to
regional contingencies either independently or in support of joint operations.
The continuing evolution of the submarine has provided the United States
with a naval platform capable of performing a variety of naval warfare tasks
simultaneously. These include the fundamental naval warfare tasks of ASW,
anti-surface warfare (ASUW), strike, and mine warfare, and the supporting naval
warfare tasks of special warfare, ocean surveillance, and intelligence. 5 It is
important to clearly develop how this multimission capability contributes to the
four "pillars" of national defense.
C. FORWARD PRESENCE
The new definition of forward presence emphasizes the need to "show our
commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and
4See H. Lawrence Garrett III, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, and General A. M. Gray, "The
Way Ahead," US Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1991, 42. "Freed from a nearly full-time
requirement to train for ASW in far-forward areas, [the submarine] force now can be available for
more regional power-projection and support missions. (Emphasis added)".
~*See Submarine Roles in the 1990's and Beyond, 8.
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provide a crisis-response capability while promoting US influence and access. "^
Traditionally, the carrier battle group (CVBG), Surface Action Group (SAG), and
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) provided the ships necessary to provide the
presence commonly referred to as naval diplomacy or "gunboat diplomacy."'
During the Cold War, the submarine was seldom considered a platform useful
for gunboat diplomacy. Now, as the projected number of Navy ships continues
to decline and the need for forward presence remains unchanged, the possibility
of using the submarine for presence operations needs to be reevaluated."
1. Peacetime Engagement (Naval Diplomacy)
According to Dr. Jan Breemer^, there are generally three arguments used
to "prove" that a submarine is "inherently unsuitable as a weapon of 'violent
^National Military Strategy, 7.
'For further discussions of naval diplomacy and presence see, James Cable, Gunboat
Diplomacy 1919-1979 (London: The Macrrullan Press, 1981); Edward N. Luttwak, The Political
Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); and Barry M.
Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces As a Political
Instrument (Washington, D.C : The Brookings Institution, 1978).
"The Senate Armed Services Committee has raised concerns over the Navy's ability to
meet forward presence commitments using traditional methods, namely the carrier battle
group. It has tasked the Department of Defense to submit a report outlining alternatives to
the traditional method of providing forward presence. See "Senate Armed Services
Committee Wants Examination of Naval Forward Presence," Inside the Navy, 17 August 1992,
5-6.
"The following discussion is based in large part on Jan S. Breemer, "Where are the
Submarines? Deterrence, Naval Presence, and the Submarine Fleet," In Proceedings of the Fifth
Submarine Technology Symposium (U), 12-14 May 1992 , by the Naval Submarine League and
Johns Hopkins University - Applied Physics Laboratory (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins
University - Applied Physics Laboratory, 1992), 73-80, JHU/APL STD-R-2121; and on the
master's thesis of Brent Alan Ditzler, "Naval Diplomacy Beneath The Waves: A Study of the
Coercive Use of Submarines Short of War" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
December 1989).
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peace. '"10 The first involves the fact that the submarine is not a visible threat.
The second concerns the inability of the submarine to engage in "proportional"
violence as is seen during periods of crisis short of war. The last argument
relates to the first and involves the belief that the submarine lacks the physical
appearance to "impress" and thus is incapable of sending a signal.il
The issue of visibility is based upon the interpretation of deterrence
theory that, "in order for a threat . . to be credible and thus deter . . it must be
communicated or signaled (Emphasis in original). "12 From this interpretation has
followed the concurrent belief that in order for a threat to be communicated or
signaled, it must be visible. Proponents of this argument, which is used to
dismiss the submarine as an instrument of naval diplomacy, apparently ignore a
very important exception to this "rule" and at the same time invalidate the forces
they seem to be defending. Since its first deployment on patrol in the early
1960s, the nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) has provided the United
States with a deterrent whose credibility in large part was due to its invisibility.
Due to the success of the submarine in "strategic gunboat diplomacy", is it not
plausible that a submarine can provide the same deterrent effect in a regional
situation? In a similar vein, if the need for visibility was that imperative for
gunboat diplomacy, then it should be easily demonstrated that the traditional
instruments used for naval diplomacy have indeed been visible to the opponent.
In thinking of gunboat diplomacy, one might conjure up images of the





use of port calls to demonstrate intent is not a major factor in naval diplomacy.^
What is predominantly used to signal intent is the stationing of naval forces in or
near a region of current interest to the United States. Those not familiar with the
naval service would be surprised to learn the area that a typical carrier battle
group encompasses, let alone the distance from potentially hostile territory. The
extent of this area is illustrated in Figure 1 below.




















































Source: "The Maritime Strategy/' Supplement to tine US Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986.
To say that the naval forces of the United States, except in unusual
circumstances, are visible in the figurative term to potential adversaries is
-^Ibid.: "Foreign portcalls can be a part of naval influence-seeking, but they are
peripheral to the problem of how naval forces can best deter or compel in an international
crisis."
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stretching the imagination. The need for a protective perimeter, as well as the
recognition of territorial waters, precludes major naval vessels from approaching
within visual distance of an opponent. 1^ How then can the traditional
"gunboats" of the US Navy signal or communicate intent without being seen?
The answer lies not with the naval forces, but with the country using them to
signal or communicate a threat. For the most part, US naval forces are visible to
potential adversaries because the United States government chooses them to be
through announcements, news coverage, etc. Using this method of making naval
forces visible, the submarine is just as suitable a platform for naval diplomacy as
other naval forces.^ In fact, due to its stealth and survivability, the submarine
brings a degree of stability to an otherwise potentially unstable crisis that surface
vessels do not. 16
The second argument against the use of submarines for presence
operations is that the submarine is not capable of proportional violence. "The
claim in this case is that the submarine is an all-or-nothing platform - it cannot
fire a weapon without meaning to kill its target and therefore commit an act of
war."1' As a result of this, critics would say, the submarine is ineffective in
situations where the opponent does not expect war to break out. This argument
14Breemer, 11-12.
^This is the conclusion also of a recent Joint Staff study named Potent Striker 1,
"'Presence' does not require constant visibility. The mystique of a possible sub offshore can
be exploited with proper PR/PSYOPS." See Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Deputy
Director for Assessment/J8, "Final Report," Potent Striker I (Washington, D.C.: US




against the use of submarines for naval diplomacy is flawed for a number oi
reasons.
One can use the general theory of deterrence to demonstrate the lack of
consensus on the "proportionality" issue. One school, referred to as the "finality
of deterrence" school, believes that "successful deterrence hinges on the
threatener's resolve to inflict punishment in-excess-of-the-crime."^ According
to this school, the threat of ultimate destruction, by whatever means, will
successfully deter since the consequences of the response far outweigh the
potential gains. The other deterrence school, the "credibility of deterrence"
school, believes that deterrence is onlv successful if it is credible and thus relies
heavily on the perceptions of the deteree. Following this line of reasoning, to be
credible, the threats must be "proportionate" or "graduated. "1° in looking at
these two schools of thought, one school would support the use of the submarine
for naval presence due to the level of violence that the submarine represents. The
other school, however, rejects the submarine due to its inability to inflict
proportional violence. The proponents of arguments against submarines ignore
the lack of consensus on this type of deterrence. Without consensus on what
actually deters, the submarine cannot be discounted as a potential instrument of
naval diplomacy based on this unresolved argument.
A specific example can also refute the argument of proportionality. The
sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano by the British nuclear submarine
18Ibid., 19
^Ibid.; and see also for further discussion of deterrence theory, Edward Rhodes, Power
and MADness: The Logic of Nuclear Coercion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989);
and Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of
Armageddon (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989) and "Deterrence and
Perception," Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
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Conqueror during the Falklands War is an example of a tactically disproportionate
response, yet at the same time a striking example of a strategically appropriate
response. The Belgrano was sunk with no warning and was not a direct threat to
the British fleet. Thus, at a tactical level, the sinking was disproportionate. At
the strategic level, however, the sinking of the Belgrano sent a clear signal to the
Argentine Navy, which responded for the most part by staying in port for the
duration of the war. 20 The importance of the example is that indeed the
submarine played a significant role in signaling during the Falklands War with a
level of violence that far exceeded that necessary for the tactical situation.
Another key point to realize in this discussion of the proportionality
issue is the applicability of this argument to naval diplomacy- The use of
"proportionate violence" in naval diplomacy involves only a limited number of
cases, yet the submarine's inability to exercise it is being used to preclude the
submarine from participating in naval diplomacy of any form. As Dr. Breemer
points out, "The submarine may not be the platform-of-choice to enforce an
embargo but this does not automatically exclude it from the whole spectrum of
naval suasive tasks. "21 Additionally, as the missions of maritime forces continue
to overlap with those of land-based ground and air forces, particularly
concerning regional contingencies, it is difficult for any naval force today to
inflict proportional violence. The primary example of this would be in the ability
to strike land targets. Except for the 5" gun, the weapon of surface ships and




or submarine forces possess a decided advantage in terms of proportionate
violence when it comes to projecting power ashore.
It should be noted that the US submarine does not possess any
"proportional response capability" due to the imperatives established by the
Cold War. During the Cold War, there was no need for such a submarine
weapon that would have arguably taken away storage for other more useful
weapons. Now, in this post-Cold War world, the rationale for weapons capable
of "proportional response" may be more compelling. The development and
utilization of a submarine launched weapon capable of disabling other vessels
would significantly improve the submarine's usefulness in counter-proliferation
and forward presence operations.
The issue of the physical appearance of the submarine and its inability to
impress can be similarly refuted. First, the use of the port call to signal intent is
at the "bottom of the presence ladder"22 and involves only a small portion oi the
total cases of naval diplomacy. Second, the belief that the submarine is ill-suited
to that role is obviously not shared by the United States, itself having used
submarines to signal intent in the past.2^
During the Cold War, the role of submarines in naval diplomacy was not
significant. This was due to the combination of the overriding mission
requirements of the submarine force and the ability of other warfare
communities in the Navy to meet naval diplomacy commitments. Now, in this
post-Cold War era, we find the traditional mission requirements of the
22Ibid., 23.
-"The most striking example is the port visit of the USS Sam Houston, a Polaris SSBN, to
Turkey in April 1963 that was used to signal support following tine United States' removal of
Jupiter missiles. (Cited in Breemer, 23; and Submarine Roles in the 199U's and Beyond, 10).
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submarine are no longer as demanding, while the size of all forces of the US
Navy are declining. To allow the United States to fulfill its requirements for
presence, the previous exclusion of the submarine from the "presence club" must
be reconsidered. This is not to presume that the submarine can replace the
'traditional' instruments of naval diplomacy, such as the carrier battle group or
amphibious ready group. Instead, the submarine can be used in certain
situations as independent actors, or more likely, in concert with other naval
forces. The complementary role of the submarine is its strength in contributing
to this traditional objective of forward presence.
2. Enhance Crisis Response Capability
During the Cold War, the US submarine force maintained a forward
presence to fulfill its role in supporting nuclear deterrence and in providing crisis
response against a Soviet threat. Now, with the focus on regional contingencies
the submarine can continue to contribute to US crisis response capability by
maintaining a forward presence, either as an independent or joint actor. In the
submarine as an independent unit, the operational commander has a platform
capable of providing ocean surveillance of potentially hostile ships, as well as a
means of obtaining real-time intelligence without compromising surprise or
escalating tensions. The independent submarine can also be relocated during the
initial phases of a crisis to provide a wide range of prompt responses to the
operational commander without employing more vulnerable and crisis-unstable
forces. The submarine as an element of a maritime action group (MAG),24 serves
as an important force multiplier for the immediate operational capability of the
"-^For a further discussion of the MAG concept, see Vice Admiral William Owens,
"Mediterranean Fleet: A Test-bed for Navy's Future," Armed Forces journal, July 1992, 32-35.
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United States in a crisis region. Thus, the submarine force by maintaining
forward deployed forces contributes to the rapid-response capability of US
forces.
To summarize, the submarine force contributes to the national objective of
forward presence through peacetime engagement, and by enhancing the US
crisis response capability. The need to use the submarine for the role of
peacetime engagement is becoming greater with the declining numbers of ships
in the Navy. The submarine's potential as an instrument of naval diplomacy has
been previously demonstrated. Yet it remains to be used for that purpose
extensively. The 'traditional' role of the forward deployed submarine to enhance
crisis response capability is being refocused from a Soviet threat to that of
regional contingencies. This provides the operational commander with
additional capabilities and significant flexibility in periods of rising tensions. The
submarine is valuable in this role as a force multiplier for a maritime action
group, and as a rapid response-capable forward element for a crisis response
force. The submarine's enduring strengths make it a flexible platform capable of
assuming independent or joint roles in support of forward presence. These roles
are not dependent upon the threat from Russian naval forces and thus force
levels supporting this role, which constitutes a unique area of US strategic




The value of the submarine in crisis response is its flexibility to operate
independently or jointly as the situation requires.2° This gives the submarine the
ability either to respond quickly and operate in a hostile environment with no
local maritime or aerospace superiority, or to operate in support of other
maritime or ground based forces. In the first role, submarines would be sent to a
crisis location before other forces to perform suppression of the opponent's
offensive capabilities to allow easier ingress of follow-on forces to the region and
to collect real-time intelligence of the situation for the operational commander.
In joint operations, the submarine can simultaneously support both defensive
and offensive tasks as designated by the joint force commander. The
fundamental tasks that the submarine can perform in crisis response include
ASW, ASUW, strike, mine warfare as well as the supporting tasks of special
warfare, ocean surveillance, and intelligence.
ASW This traditional Cold War task of the submarine remains the same
except for a change of venue from the Soviet Union to an unnamed regional
contingency. The threat of diesel submarines in regional conflicts is real and
complicates maritime operations when conducted in a regional scenario.26 The
submarine force has constantly trained for the task of forward ASW and would
employ this capability in the offense suppression mission of initial crisis
response. Following the ingress of all forces into the region and for the egress of
^For an excellent description of the submarine in crisis response or regional warfare, see
William J. Toti, "Sea-Air-Land Battle Doctrine/' US Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1985,
70-74.
^°For a description of the Third World submarine threat, see James Fitzgerald and John
Benedict, "There Is A Sub Threat," US Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1990, 57-63.
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forces following the conclusion of the crisis, the submarine can contribute to the
defensive ASW posture protecting vital maritime assets from ASW threats.
ASUW Similar to the ASW task, the submarine can perform ASUW both as
an independent actor or jointly- In the role of offense suppression, the submarine
would locate and destroy surface platforms that pose the greatest threats to
follow-on forces, such as cruise missile platforms. In the joint role, the submarine
would contribute to defense of fleet assets by monitoring movements and
preventing enemy surface forces from leaving port.
Strike Warfare Though primarily an offensive oriented task, the submarine
can use strike warfare for both offensive and defensive purposes. As an
independent actor conducting offense suppression for follow-on forces, the
submarine can use precision strikes against ground-based surface to surface
missile sites, such as the Silkworm, and against coastal and inland airfields.
Acting in a joint role, the cruise missile carrying submarine can provide defense
suppression for land- and sea-based air strikes, and can participate in integrated
strike operations.
Mine Warfare The submarine's unique capabilities provide the joint force
commander in a regional contingency with the ability to dominate this often
neglected facet of naval warfare. The traditional mine warfare mission of the
submarine concerns use of the submarine's stealth to allow it to deploy mines for
offensive purposes. This traditional capability will primarily be used in the
initial offense suppression operations of an independent forward operating
submarine. Mine warfare can be used against surface or submarine threats to
keep combatants from leaving port or transiting a choke point, or can be used to
enforce a blockade or embargo.
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An unexplored and potentially more important mission of the submarine in
mine warfare lies in the ability of the submarine to provide an aggressive means
of defending against hostile mine warfare forces. The US Navy's experience in
the Persian Gulf over the last ten years provides sufficent evidence of the impact
of relatively simple mine warfare capability on maritime operations. So far the
emphasis in combatting mine warfare has been on locating and neutralizing or
avoiding minefields. The utility of the submarine in mine warfare is its ability to
covertly identify, monitor, and, if necessary, destroy hostile minelaying craft
prior to the laying of significant numbers of mines. This anti-mining mission is a
fundamentally new direction for submarines and the US Navy and will become
more important in future regional contingencies.
Special Warfare The submarine's ability to operate covertly in hostile waters
makes it an ideal platform for support of special warfare operations.
"Submarines allow small groups of special-operations forces to be inserted with
the elements of surprise and secrecy essential to their missions. "2? These
operations can be conducted at any time during a conflict.28
Ocean Surveillance and Intelligence The submarine's unique characteristics
of stealth and agility allow it to perform these supporting tasks while retaining
the key strategic elements of surprise and initiative for the operational
commander. In a situation of crisis response, submarines can be used to shadow
potential naval threats before hostilities escalate without the fear of provoking a
preemptive response. The intelligence capabilities of the submarine can be used
^'Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, "Submarine Warfare - It's A-Changing," US Naval
Institute Proceedings, June 1992, 53.
^°For further discussion of the submarine's role in special warfare see John L. Byron, "A
New Target for the Submarine Force," US Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1990, 37-39.
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throughout a conflict to support amphibious or ground operations, anti-mining
operations, as well as to gather real-time tactical and strategic intelligence
information.
1. Rapid Response and Offense Suppression
The most important role that submarines play in crisis response is that of
rapid response and offense suppression. The submarine is the ideal platform for
this role due to its stealth. Its ability to remain undetected allows it to be inserted
into a hostile region without the need for significant defensive support. The
ability of submarines to perform offense suppression of sea and land based
threats performs two functions for the operational commander. First, it reduces
the threat to follow-on forces by destruction or degradation of the adversary'sJO j
capabilities. Second, it forces the adversary to divert his forces from operations
against follow-on forces to operations to neutralize the submarine threat. The
submarine's unique capabilities also provide the operational commander with
real-time covert intelligence that could prove invaluable to coordination and
defense of follow-on forces.
2. Joint Task Force Support and Ground Warfare Support
In joint operations, the submarine can simultaneously support both
defensive and offensive tasks as designated by the operational commander. The
fundamental tasks that the submarine can perform in crisis response include
ASW, ASUW, Strike, and Mine Warfare as well as the supporting tasks of Special
Warfare, Ocean Surveillance, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), and
Intelligence. The submarine's role in joint task force and ground warfare support
is complementary in nature. The submarine can be tasked with missions from
either the joint force commander or commander in chief (CINC), or the local
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Battle Group or Naval Expeditionary Force commander. The operational
commander can use the submarine for a variety of missions in support of ground
or amphibious forces or for insertion, extraction, or support of special forces. The
Naval Expeditionary Force commander can use the submarine for support of
maritime forces in the area. In both cases, this support would occur in situations
where follow-on forces have arrived and established themselves in the region.
Additionally, the submarine will continue its offense suppression efforts, using
its ability to operate far forward.
3. Integrated Strike Operations
The ability of the submarine to employ cruise missiles provides the
operational commander with additional flexibility and strike capability.
Submarines will not replace traditional carrier aircraft heavy-strike ordnance, but
submarine-launched cruise missiles could be the vanguard element that attacks air-defense,
early-warning, and communications facilities to reduce the threat against follow-on aircraft. .
. Just as important, the submarine can exploit the element of surprise by launching the attack
along an undefended axis.-^"
This is especially true for the improved Los Angeles class or SSN-688I
class submarines that carry twelve external vertical launch cells for carrying
cruise missiles in addition to those carried internally on all other submarines.
The effectiveness of the Tomahazvk missile was ably demonstrated during
Operation Desert Storm.30
In summary, these three roles, of rapid response and offense suppression,
task force and ground support, and integrated strike operations, demonstrate
^--Wice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, "Submarine Warfare - It's A-Changing," US Naval
Institute Proceedings, June 1992, 53.
•^See Donald C. Daniel, Beyond the 600-Ship Navy. Adelphi Paper 261 (London: Brassey'i
for International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991), 29.
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that the submarine is an important contributor to the national objective of crisis
response. As with the submarine roles that support forward presence, these roles
are not dependent upon the threat of Russian naval forces.
E. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND STRATEGIC DEFENSE
The National Security Strategy of the United States divides its discussion of
deterrence into strategic and non-strategic forces. 31 Strategic forces deal with
strategic deterrence, strategic defense, and national technical means of
verification, while the non-strategic forces deal with regional deterrence of
weapons of mass destruction. Strategic forces appear to be declining in
importance, while concern over regional deterrence is growing.
1. Strategic Deterrence
The instruments for maintaining strategic deterrence were developed as
integral parts of the Cold War. The primary differences between the force
structures supporting strategic deterrence in the new era from force structures of
the Cold War are size and defenses. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) as well as the unilateral initiatives of the United States and the republics
of the former Soviet Union have led to real reductions in on-alert nuclear
weapons by both superpowers. As the United States has taken its bomber force
off alert and deactivated half of its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force
in preparation for dismantling,^ the sea-based leg of the strategic triad has
assumed more responsibility. Precisely because of its unique characteristics, the
^See National Security Strategy of the United States, 25-27.
^For further details, see Department of Defense, "Department of Defense News Briefing
with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS, Pete Williams,
ASD (Public Affairs) Saturday, September 28, 1991," which followed the President's nuclear
initiative address on national television.
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SSBN continues to provide the United States with a powerful invulnerable
weapon system capable of deterring nuclear attack. 33
2. Strategic Defense
a. Strategic ASW
A less publicized facet of nuclear deterrence is the role played by the
US attack submarine.34 The ability of the submarine to conduct forward ASW
allows it to hold opposing SSBNs at risk. This was a key element in NATO's
Maritime Strategy. Critics of strategic ASW in the past claimed that destroying
Soviet SSBNs during the conventional phase of the conflict would seriously affect
crisis stability by forcing the Soviet Union to escalate to nuclear war or risk losing
some of its sea-based nuclear weapons. Proponents of strategic ASW claimed
that the destruction of SSBNs would not be enough incentive to force the Soviets
to escalate to general nuclear war. At best, the loss of SSBNs would sufficiently
change the nuclear correlation of forces to provide NATO with escalation
^Ibid., 7. The Government Accounting Office has released the preliminary findings of
its report on the strategic triad, this report notes the significant strengths of the SSBN as
compared to the other members of the triad, see "GAO Attacks Assumptions on Strategic
Forces, Finds Little Reason for B-2, ICBMs," Inside The Navy, 5 October 1992, 1. Also for
further discussions see Submarine Roles in the 1990'sand Beyond, 11; Richard T Ackley, Trident
SSBNs in START (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1990), Technical Report NPS-
56-90-008; and Richard L. Garwin, "Will Strategic Submarines Be Vulnerable?" Naval Strategy
and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 222-237.
•^4 For discussions of strategic ASW, see Garwin, "Will Strategic Submarines Be
Vulnerable?"; Tom Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy (Lexington,
MA and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987); and Donald C. Daniel, Anti-submarine Warfare and
Superpower Strategic Stability (Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986). Tine
issue of strategic ASW was a common topic for articles and discussion in Naval Institute
Proceedings, for examples see: John L. Byron, "No Quarter for Their Boomers," April 1989, 49-
52; Michael N. Pocalyko, "Sinking Soviet SSBNs," October 1987, 24-36; Richard T. Ackley,
"No Bastions for the Bear: Round 2," April 1985, 42-47; and James J. Tntten, "Strategic ASW:
A Good Idea?" January 1984, 90-92.
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dominance and force the Soviets to terminate the conflict on terms favorable to
the Alliance.
The strategic situation the United States faces today and in the
future will be fundamentally different from the one it faced during the Cold War.
With START reductions, along with the proposed unilateral reductions of
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the proportion of warheads carried by
Russian SSBNs will initially become more significant. If the United States and
Russia follow through on their agreement to de-MIRV35 land-based ICBMs, then
sea-based warheads will comprise the majority of former Soviet nuclear
weapons. With these trends, the situation of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
will become less certain and the role of the attack submarine in true damage
limitation through strategic ASW will become more significant. 36 The converse
side of this logic is that Russia, faced with declining numbers of nuclear
warheads may choose to remove all of its nuclear warheads from submarines
and base its strategic forces solely on land. If this is the case, then the need for
submarines to fulfill the role of strategic ASW will obviously disappear.
An argument against strategic ASW is that the possibility of a
nuclear exchange is so remote, that it is does not justify maintaining submarines
for that express purpose. Indeed, this points out the difference between
^MIRV refers to Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles.
^"There is by no means a consensus on the effect of MAD on strategic nuclear deterrence
let alone MAD's precise definition. For tine purposes of this thesis MAD is defined to be a
situation where two opponents possess the capability to destroy the other but are unable to
prevent their own destruction. There is an opposing view of MAD as a distinct policy of both
actors, however this paper does not use that definition. For a more complete discussion of
MAD and its affect on the superpower relationship see, Rhodes, Power and MADness: The
Logic of Nuclear Coercion ; and Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft
and the Prospect ofArmageddon.
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programming and war planning. The submarine force can ill afford to justify its
existence solely on the remote possibility of nuclear war. Thus, for programming
purposes, submarine force structure determinations should not be based on this
role. At the same time, however, the consequences of nuclear war are so
immense, that for war planning purposes and for design requirements for future
submarines, the role of strategic ASW cannot be ignored.^?
b. GPALS
An additional future role for the submarine force in strategic defense
concerns the possibility of using the submarine as a platform for the Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system for Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) defense. As US strategy shifts from global defense to regional defense,
the submarine must also be considered as a possible platform for Anti-Tactical
Ballistic Missile (ATBM) defense as well. The submarine could prove to be an
ideal platform for weapons designed to intercept ballistic missiles in their initial
boost stages of flight. The characteristics of stealth, endurance, and agility all
make the submarine the ideal platform for this mission.
3. National Technical Means of Verification
Arms control is another role of the submarine related to strategic nuclear
deterrence. With START in the process of being implemented, and with the
numerous unilateral initiatives, the submarine provides the United States with an
3' See James J Tritten, "Address to the Submarine Technology Symposium, 12 May
1992," The Submarine Review (July 1992), 26; or "Chairman's Remarks and Paper - The
Submarine's Role in Future Naval Warfare," in Proceedings of the Fifth Submarine Technology
Symposium (U), 12-14 May 1992, by the Naval Submarine League and Johns Hopkins
University - Applied Physics Laboratory (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University - Applied
Physics Laboratory, 1992), 45-60, JHU/APL STD-R-2121.
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irreplaceable national technical means (NTM) of verification.^ This is not to say
that the submarine is the primary NTM of verification. Its role is
complementary, providing data and information unavailable through other
means. As with the capability to conduct strategic ASW, the United States must
continue to use its submarines for verification as long as potential adversaries
retain SSBNs and as long as there are treaties or agreements governing these
weapons.
4. Regional Deterrence of Weapons of Mass Destruction
President Bush pushed the subject of non-strategic nuclear forces into
the shadows with his nuclear initiative of September 27, 1991.39 -phis initiative
eliminated or removed to storage much of the US non-strategic nuclear arsenal.
Included in this initiative was the nuclear variant of the Tomahawk land attack
missile (TLAM-N). This initiative was "intended to enhance our security
through arms reductions while preserving the capability to regenerate selected
forces if required. "40 jn^ s new WOrld order, with the prospect of Third World
countries developing and using weapons of mass destruction against our
national interests or against the United States, the TLAM-N carried on a
submarine could offer the leverage necessary to provide or strengthen regional
nuclear deterrence in the future. The submarine carrying TLAM-Ns provides
advantages to regional nuclear deterrence which other possible platforms do not.
By being able to remain undetected, the submarine strengthens crisis stability by
eliminating any advantage gained by preemption. The submarine's ability to
^Submarine Roles in the 1990's and Beyond, 12-13.
^"See Department of Defense News Briefing of September 28, 1991.
^National Military Strategy 1992, 13.
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operate independently, remain on station for extended periods, and deploy
quickly to crisis areas, gives it a decided advantage over other eligible platforms.
Surface naval and air forces capable of employing nuclear weapons require
substantially more support forces to ensure sustainability and self-defense.
Furthermore, surface and air forces provide more incentive for preemption, thus
weakening crisis stability by being more vulnerable to detection and attack. To
fill this role, the submarine force must retain the capability to handle and employ
the TLAM-N weapon system. The incentives for eliminating that capability are
compelling in the short term, but the submarine's contributions to future regional
nuclear deterrence outweigh any possible short term gains.
To summarize, the submarine force has plaved a major role in nuclear
deterrence, and that role appears to be growing. With the recent agreements on
nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia, the importance of the
SSBN is growing. Additionally, the role of the submarine in strategic ASW has
not yet changed nor has its value as a national technical means of verification.
One role that the submarine has played in the past appears to be changing. That
role involves the ability to employ the TLAM-N, which was previously designed
for use against the former Soviet Union but now appears to be well suited to
regional conflicts involving weapons of mass destruction. The submarine
carrying the TLAM-N is well suited to the task of strengthening non-strategic
nuclear deterrence in regional crises. The submarine's roles in supporting
nuclear deterrence are very similar to its roles during the Cold War. With the
exception of the regional nuclear deterrence mission, they are still largely
dependent upon the naval forces of Russia and require the use of the nuclear
submarine as an independent actor. As the capability of the naval forces of
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Russia continues to decline, the number of US submarines that are necessary to
fill this role will decline as well. Much of US submarine force levels based upon
this role are dependent upon the outcome of verifiable bilateral and unilateral
decisions concerning nuclear warhead numbers and deployment methods.
F. RECONSTITUTION
The nuclear submarine, due to the time required for its construction, is ill-
suited for consideration as a reconstitutable asset.41 Yet, the submarine still
plays a number of roles in the concept of reconstitution. These roles involve
deterring the emergence of a competing naval power through the maintenance of
a submarine industrial base and the maintenance of undersea superiority, and
providing warning time to the United States of the emergence or reemergence of
a global threat that would require the reconstitution of forces.
1. Deterrence of Emergent Global Threat
a. Maintenance of Submarine Industrial Base
Included in the concept of reconstitution is the maintenance of an
adequate industrial base. With the number of submarine shipyards reduced to
two and with the cancellation of the Seawolf program, maintenance of a
submarine industrial base is a current and vital issue. The two submarine
shipyards wall finish building 688-class submarines by 1996 or 1997. Serious
decisions must be made soon concerning the submarine industrial base. This
"mission" has rapidly become the most important issue for the submarine force
today.
^Ivice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, "Submarine Warfare - It's A-Changing," US Naval
Institute Proceedings, June 1992, 54; "It takes 12 years to design and build a nuclear attack
submarine."
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b. Maintenance of Undersea Superiority
In addition to maintaining an industrial base, the United States must
maintain its undersea advantage and thus make it too costly for any potential
enemy to consider building a capable submarine force. The world has seen two
ruthlessly successful submarine campaigns conducted this century alone. It can
ill afford to witness another.
2. Threat Identification
The submarine's ability to conduct ocean surveillance and to collect
intelligence will contribute to this nation's ability to guarantee adequate warning
time to allow for the ability to "reconstitute a credible defense faster than any
potential opponent can generate an overwhelming offense. "42 This role is
decidedly small in the overall context of strategic warning, however it provides
information that may be unobtainable through other sources.
In summary, these two roles demonstrate that despite its inability to be
reconstituted, the submarine is still a factor in the national objective of
reconstitution. The primary goal of reconstitution is to deter an emergent global
threat. By maintaining a viable submarine industrial base and maintaining our
technological achievements in undersea superiority, the submarine becomes a
significant contributor to this goal. If deterrence fails, the submarine will be one
of the means of verifying the existence of an emergent global threat. It is
important to note that this role has little to do with the former Soviet Union as it
exists today. Rather, this role deals primarily with the future opponents of the
United States. Whether or not they emerge from the remains of the Soviet Union
is irrelevant.
^National Security Strategy of the United States, 30.
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G. CONCLUSIONS
This discussion of roles and missions for US submarines is important for a
number of reasons. First, it demonstrates that the notion of the submarine as
solely a Cold War weapons system is clearly flawed. The submarine is a very
effective weapons system for regional warfare as well. In fact, with the exception
of the national objective of nuclear deterrence and defense, the submarine roles
and missions just discussed relate to the more likely possibility of regional
conflicts and crises, along with the possible emergence of a global threat in the
future. Second, the submarine is clearly not solely an ASW platform. Even
during the Cold War, the submarine was designed and developed to have
multimission capability. This capability is needed now more than ever in not
only the submarine force but in all US weapons systems. Those opponents of
submarines as single mission weapons platforms are correct in stating that we
cannot afford to field weapons that are unidimensional, however, they are
incorrect to infer that the submarine is unidimensional.
Clearly, this discussion is not meant to portray the submarine as the ultimate
weapon system for the new world order. Instead, the purpose of the
presentation is to outline the multiple and various means in which the submarine
can contribute in this new international security environment. The submarine's
unique characteristics of stealth, endurance, and agility as well as its
multimission capabilities make it an important contributor to forward presence,
crisis response, deterrence, and reconstitution. Table 1 summarizes these
contributions below.
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In looking at these roles and missions for the submarine, one should realize
that the heirarchy of the four "pillars" is in a state of transition. During the Cold
War, nuclear deterrence and forward presence were the high priorities.43 Now,
with the focus on regional warfare, forward presence and crisis response are
becoming the highest priorities. Figure 2 illustrates the new emphasis for
submarine roles. As the emphasis for roles and missions changes, this requires a
reevaluation of submarine force structure and submarine design. This ensures
that they are still supporting the main focus of submarine operations.
Figure 2. Submarine Roles In The Operational Continuum
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In this period of defense drawdowns, the issue of force structure in the
military is becoming the focal point for competition for a share of the shrinking
federal budgetary pie. The purpose of this chapter is not to become involved in
parochial issues concerning force size or comparative benefits of particular
weapons systems. 1 Instead, this chapter will attempt to address objectively
certain issues related to force structure in order to clearly define the boundaries
of the ongoing debate. The term force structure in this chapter refers not only to
force size, but also includes the means for utilization of existing assets.
B. FORCE SIZE
Submarine force size is becoming the subject of considerable debate today.
Contributing factors in this debate are the cancellation of the Seawolf submarine,
perceptions that the submarine is obsolete and unsuited to the new world order,
and desires to reap a "peace dividend" from increased defense cuts. The
purpose of this section is to address both the short and long term issues that will
affect the force size of the submarine force in the post-Cold War era. This section
assumes that, indeed, there is a role for the submarine in the post-Cold War
world.
'•A recent study of the Joint Staff on the submarine's relationship to the National Military
Strategy concluded, "The panel found the current articulation of national strategy neither
sufficiently specific to shape force structure decisions, nor cast in sufficiently
palatable/strong terms to justify resource requirements." See Department of Defense, Joint
Staff, Deputy Director for Assessment/J8, "Final Report," Potent Striker 1 (Washington, D.C.:
US Department of Defense, 1992), 2.
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If force size were set entirely by the Department of Defense, in a period of
unlimited resources and objective mindsets, then submarine force levels would
be based upon requirements determined by the Navy and the unified
Commanders in Chief (CINCs). These force levels would be based upon
perceived threats and force packages deemed necessary to meet operational
requirements to meet those threats. Given that the resources of the Department
of Defense are finite, then decisions must be made to match resources to
requirements in the most efficient way possible. These decisions are made by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Chairman of the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and
their staffs, and the guidelines are set by the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
These decisions are simply an input into the overall federal budgetary process.
Overall force structure will be affected further by resource allocations set by the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and finally set by the Congress into
law during the annual defense authorizations and appropriations process/
Given this process for force size determination, what are the critical factors
that have changed that will affect the ultimate size of the submarine force? The
most obvious, as discussed in the Introduction, is the end of the Cold War.
According to the New York Times, this has drastically changed the DPG with its
perception of the threat and possible warfighting scenarios.3 The resulting
submarine requirements as established by the Navy and the unified CINCs will
undoubtedly be reduced with the reduced threat. The end of the Cold War has
"-For a better description of this process, see Frederick Hartmann and Robert Wendzel,
"The Defense Resource Allocation Process," in Defending America's Security (New York:
Brassey's, 1991).
•^See "Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to Fight in Post-Cold War Era: Plans for
Hypothetical Conflicts and Big Budgets," Netv York Times, 17 February 1992, p. 1(A).
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also put a further demand on resources. With the reduced threat, both the
Executive and Legislative branches of the government have reduced the budget
for overall defense expenditures. This reduction will certainly reduce the force
size of the submarine force, but also will increase friction between competing
communities within the Navy and between the individual services for scarce
resources. These changes affecting the requirements process have both short-
term and long-term implications for submarine force size. The short-term
implications involve the transition from a Cold War submarine force size to a
regional defense submarine force size. The long-term implications involve the
ultimate size of the submarine force in the post-Cold War world.
1. Short Term Factors, The "Glide Slope" of Submarine Reductions
In looking at the short-term implications on submarine force size, one must
realize that virtually all involved in the process agree that the submarine force of
the future will be smaller than it was during the Cold War. The issues in the
debate involve the transition from a Cold War force size of over 90 submarines to
a post-Cold War force size of indeterminate number. There have been numerous
attempts to place a number on submarine force size, including the Base Force
level of the Administration of 80 SSNs, and the varying force packages of
Representative Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee,
which have postulated force levels of 20 to 50 SSNs.4 There are currently 84
submarines in the force with 14 submarines of the improved SSN 688 class still
under construction. Seazvolf class submarine production has certainly been
canceled, however, the final number to be produced, whether it is one, two, or
"*See Representative Les Aspin, An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the
Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options (Washington, D.C.: US Congress, 25 February 1992),
Chart II.
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three, has yet to be ironed out. Figure 3 shows the postulated submarine force
structure using nominal sen ice es * tht pre-SSX 688 class submarines of 25
years and the assumed construction of one SSX 21 class submarine. The service
life of 25 years is nomina; c:m : ' - m..: - me submarines have been either
extended in life or retired earl\ due to considerations about the remainder of
nuclear fuel remaining or for budgetary reasons
Figure 3. Submarine Force Levels
100
1990 1991 1 992 1 993 1 994 1 995 ] 996 1 997 1 998 1 999 2000
YEAR
Source: Bernard Prezelin, Combat Flee:- of the World 1990/1991
(Annapolis Naval Institute Press, 1991)
(Retirements based on nominal service life of 2~ \ ears for ? L>4- and 637-class SSNs)
The factors affecting the short term size of the submarine force are those that
are dominating the defense debates today. While there is consensus that the
United States can reduce its defense forces, there is little agreement on the proper
path to do so. There are those who desire to cut defense expenditures as rapidly
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and drastically as possible so as to reap a "peace dividend." On the other hand,
there are those who would cite the historical lessons of rapid US defense
drawdowns and their unfortunate circumstances to promote a controlled and
sensible drawdown. 5 What then are the primary factors that will affect the glide
slope of submarine force levels?
The factors that appear to be developing that will affect submarine force
levels are primarily related to economics with a few exceptions. It is interesting
to note that despite numerous projections that the defense budget would be
slashed following the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the defense
budget remained largelv intact with minor reductions. The primary factors
behind this appear to be related to the economy. Many lawmakers were
concerned that rapid and steep defense cuts would have significant effect on
employment, and further weaken an already stagnant economy. Thus, the
primary justification for holding the line on defense cuts was not related to
defense but to electoral concerns related to economics."
The best example of this is the "full court press" exerted by New England
lawmakers to reinstate the second and third Seawolf submarines following
President Bush's proposed rescission.'7 The common reasons cited for
maintaining these ships were not related to the military application of these
'-'See Admiral David E. Jeremiah, "Beyond the Cold War," US Naval Institute Proceedings,
May 1992, 52-57.
"For a discussion of Congressional concerns over defense cuts, see Pat Towell, "As Bush
Budget Nears Release, Lawmakers Dig In for Fight," Congressional Quarterly: Weekly Report,
11 January 1992, 56.
'See Pamela Fessler, "The Seawolfs Ups and Downs," Congressional Quarterly: Weekly
Report, 21 March 1992, 737; and Fessler, "Members Lobby Hard To Protect Endangered
Submarine Project," Congressional Quarterly: Weekly Report, 25 January 1992, 177.
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submarines, but rather the adverse effects these cancellations would have on the
economies of the affected states, primarily Connecticut and Rhode Island. A
related issue is the viability oi the submarine industrial base. This issue
encompasses both economic and defense concerns. 8 The concern is that if
submarines are not produced for a number of years, the United States will lose
the ability to produce nuclear submarines without a significant expenditure of
resources to revitalize the industry. This issue, though extremely important, will
not significantly affect the glide slope of submarine force reductions. This is due
to the fact that it involves the production of approximately one ship per year.
9
This is not significant in the short term, given the current numbers of
submarines. In the long term, however, it will become a major issue.
Another economic issue that will affect the glide slope of submarine force
reductions is that of the costs related to retiring submarines. The major costs
associated with submarines are those related to construction, refueling, and
retiring. The annual operating costs, or those related to normal operation of the
submarine, are small compared to other non-nuclear ships. 10 Thus, it costs
significantly more to retire a submarine than to operate it. This reality provides a
"For further discussion of Congressional motivations, see Paul N. Stockton, "The
Congressional Response," in Reconstituting America's Defense: The New U.S. National Security
Strategy, ed. James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 81-
83.
^See "The Reuter Transcript Report: Retired Admiral Carlisle Trost, Former Chief of
Naval Operations and Current Chairman of the Naval Submarine League. National Press
Club Newsmaker Address," 24 April 1992, 5. Admiral Trost discussed the need to build the
second and third Seawolf submarines, saying, "My point is to build those first three Seawolfs in
order to preserve an industrial base . . ."
^Department of the Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare),
Submarine Roles in the 1990's and Beyond ( [Washington, DC.]: US Department of the Navy,
1992), 20. "The annual operating cost of an attack submarine is about one-half that of a
destroyer or frigate and only one-third that of a cruiser."
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dilemma to those seeking short term benefits from the defense cuts: in order to
achieve defense cuts, one must actually spend more money in the short term. One
proposed solution to this is to tie up submarines at the pier and man them only
with skeleton crews until they can be decommissioned at a reasonable rate in
later years. This would provide some immediate savings in terms of decreased
life-cycle costs, however, it is simply delaying the inevitable costs associated with
retiring the submarine. Another similar option would be to "mothball" nuclear
submarines, similar to what has been done to battleships. This option has never
been utilized for nuclear powered vessels in the past. It appears that any effort to
"mothball" a submarine would have the same costs associated with it than the
costs associated with scrapping the submarine. Thus, no budgetary incentives
exists to pursue this option. These economic constraints may be the most
important factors in determining the glide slope as the submarine force prepares
to decommission 35 submarines in the next five or six years.H
The last factor that may affect the glide slope of submarine reductions in the
short term is the uncertainty of the international environment. This relates to the
argument that the United States should learn from its mistakes in its rapid and
precipitous defense drawdowns following previous wars. Given that the
international system has yet to stabilize itself following the end of the Cold War,
it is perhaps prudent to reduce our forces cautiously until we have a better
understanding of the new world around us.
If one were to look at the results of the defense debates in 1992, the first full
year after the end of the Cold War, one could draw the hasty conclusion that the
'-'•See Vice Admiral Roger Bacon, "Q & A with Vice Adm. Roger Bacon," interview by
Richard Lawson, Inside The Navy, 24 August 1992: 6. "We have inactivated 26 submarines.
Another 35 are scheduled to be inactivated in the next five or six years."
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voices of reason and caution had won the day. It is important to realize that this
year is one of exceptions rather than the rule. First, and most importantly, this is
a political election year that is clearly emphasizing economic concerns over
international concerns for the first time since World War II. As a result, many
defense questions have been decided solely on their economic merits vice any
concern over defense issues. Second, this is the last year of a budget agreement
between the President and Congress that provides a specific allotment of
discretionary funds to defense that can not be transferred to domestic spending.
This agreement thus removes any incentive, except decreasing the budget deficit,
to cut defense funds significantly. The true rate of descent of submarine force
levels will be determined by the actions of Congress in 1993.12 The factors
affecting that debate will be, once again, primarily economic however the
constraints of the debate during 1992 will no longer exist.
2. Long Term Factors, The Ultimate Size of the Regional Defense
Submarine Force
While the short term issues concerning submarine force levels affect
primarily the rate or glide slope of submarine reductions, the long term issues
will affect the ultimate force levels themselves. The primary factors can once
again be divided into economic and defense related issues. These concern the
submarine industrial base, the allocation of scarce resources both within the
federal government and within the Department of Defense, and the
determination of requirements by the unified CINCs and the Navy.
Assuming that the submarine has a place in the post-Cold War defense
establishment, the submarine industrial base may become the deciding factor for
^See Scott C. Truver, "Tomorrow's Fleet: Part I," US Naval Institute Proceedings, June
1992, 50.
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submarine force levels. Indications of the concern over this issue are evident in
the debate over the second and third Seawolf submarines.^ As a result of this
concern, the Navy has begun a study of the industrial base problem to determine
the effect of current programs and cancellations. This study will certainly have
an effect on the decision of when to start production of the next generation
submarine, tentatively named Centurion.^ It will also probably set the baseline
production number of submarines to ensure the viability of the industrial base. 15
The issue of whether to support one or two submarine shipvards will affect this
baseline. It seems obvious that a baseline to support two shipyards will be larger
than a baseline that supports only one. This baseline will be important for long
term submarine force levels. It will provide a concrete floor for submarine force
levels that cannot be broken as long as the submarine is considered a vital
weapons system for the United States. This reality can have both positive and
negative implications. In a positive sense, it provides the Navy and the unified
CINCs with a stable minimum for force package planning. In a negative sense,
the establishment of a set number may in fact become a definitive ceiling to a
Congress that is bent on achieving defense savings. Regardless of the
•^Irt addition to Fessler, "The Seawolfs Ups and Downs," and "Members Lobby Hard To
Protect Endangered Submarine Project," see Congress, Senate, National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., Report to accompany S. 3114, 31 July 1992, 39.
This Report contains a section on the submarine industrial base outlining specific concerns
and mandating an annual report on the status of the industrial base.
-^See "Q & A with Vice Adm. Roger Bacon," 6. "But until we put an end point in the
industrial base gap, which is the authorization of the next new-design submarine, the Centurion
project, what happens in the industrial base for submarine nuclear production? That is the
real issue, (emphasis added)."
l^See "Industrial Base Study Expected To Call For A 60 Boat Attack Sub Fleet," Inside The
Nflzn/, 27 July 1992, 9.
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implications, the submarine industrial base will have a significant impact on Jong
term submarine force levels.
Budgetary issues will certainly have an impact on submarine force levels.
On the level of the federal government as a whole, the problem of persistent
budget deficits will continue to force both the executive and legislative branches
to seek ways to reduce spending. The fact that defense expenditures must be
budgeted on an annual basis makes the defense budget an easy target for "quick
fixes" to budgetary problems. Within the Department of Defense, there is an
increasing competition for a share of the shrinking budgetary pie.l" This is
resulting in a comprehensive review of roles and missions for the services, with
the goal of eliminating redundancy in order to achieve budgetary savings. Thus,
the combined effects of a decreasing allocation of total funds, and the
consolidation of roles and missions in order to meet demands with a smaller
force will tend to be a limiting factor in determining submarine force levels.
The determination of requirements by the Navy and the unified CINCs will
set a number that will in all likelihood be the ceiling for submarine force levels.
This statement is based on the assumption that a distinct, global threat does not
emerge in the near future that will force a reevaluation of US defense posture.
Given the absence of a large global threat, it is inconceivable that Congress will
overrule the military's judgment in favor of larger defense expenditures on
submarines. This is already evident in the current defense debates. The
Administration, in its National Security Strategy of the United States, and the
Chairman of the JCS, in his National Military Strategy, outlined what is referred to
-^"See for an example of this, Vice Admiral Owens' discussion of the budgetary tradeoffs
that may be necessary in the future, "Owens: Carrier Level doesn't have to Drop if Budget
Continues to Drop," Inside The Navy, 5 October 1992, 3.
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as the Base Force for the military, which implies a floor for proposed defense cuts.
Congress has instead taken these figures and made them, in effect, ceilings for
their debates on defense expenditures.^ Barring any emergent global threat,
this trend of the military providing defense force level ceilings can be expected to
continue. IS
To summarize, there appear to be three main factors that will affect the
ultimate levels of the submarine force in the long term. Perhaps the most
important oi these is the submarine industrial base. Ongoing studies of this issue
should determine a baseline below which submarine procurement cannot fall
without affecting the viability of the industrial base. Thus, this factor should set
a concrete floor for submarine force levels. Note that this floor will be affected by
the decision as to maintain one or two submarine shipyards. This decision will
be a very contentious political issue. A limiting factor in long term submarine
force levels will be the impact of declining resources on both the federal budget
and the defense budget. Efforts to contain a persistent budget deficit, and
consolidation of roles and missions to reduce inter-service redundancy may
contribute to limiting submarine force levels. The final factor affecting long term
force levels will be the input from the military, primarily based upon the
requirements of the Navy and the unified CINCs. Assuming that a global threat
-'•'For a discussion of Base Force issues, see James J. Trirten, "Address to the Submarine
Technology Symposium, 12 May 1992," The Submarine Review (July 1992), 24-25, and
"Chairman's Remarks and Paper - The Submarine's Role in Future Naval Warfare," in
Proceedings of the Fifth Submarine Technology Symposium (U), 12-14 May 1992, by the Naval
Submarine League and Johns Hopkins University - Applied Physics Laboratory (Laurel, MD:
Johns Hopkins University - Applied Physics Laboratory, 1992), 45-60, JHU/APL STD-R-2121;
and Truver, "Tomorrow's Fleet: Part I," 43.
18See Stockton, 83.
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does not emerge to threaten US interests, these requirements proposed by the
military will probably serve as ceilings for submarine force levels.
C. UTILIZATION
The submarine force of the past focused on the submarine as an independent
weapon system. Though attempts were made during World War II to use some
sort of "wolfpack" formations to attack shipping,^ for the most part US
submarines operated alone. This method of operation continued throughout the
Cold War as the emphasis shifted to forward ASW.
The current organization of the submarine force supports this emphasis on
independent operation. Submarines are assigned administratively to submarine
squadrons and/or groups that are responsible for maintaining the readiness of
their respective submarines. The squadrons coordinate the local operations of
the submarines for training, exercise, or inspection purposes. While on
deployment, the submarines come under the control of the fleet operational
commanders and their assignments ensure that there will be no interference or
overlap of areas between submarines. There are instances when submarines
interact with other US naval forces. However, in the past, these interactions were
mostly for training purposes and not a commonplace event. This lack of
interaction between the submarine force and other communities to a significant
degree was due to the divergence of their Cold War missions. The need for US
submarines to concentrate on forward ASW obviated any requirement for
consistent sustained interaction with other maritime forces.
1-^See Clay Blair Jr., Silent Victory: The US Submarine War against Japan (Philadelphia and
New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1975); and Karl Lautenschlager, "Tine Submarine in Naval
Warfare, 1901-2001," Naval Strategy and National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1988), 238-284.
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As discussed in previous chapters, the roles of the submarine are changing.
The overwhelming need for forward ASW is receding rapidly, while the need for
joint operations is increasing. The inability of any component of US defense
forces to conduct joint operations effectively may result in the virtual elimination
of that component in this era of regional warfare. Given this transition in the
emphasis of roles and missions, how can the submarine force best organize itself
to ensure the most efficient utilization of its declining number of assets to
complete those missions assigned to it?
The new roles and missions of the submarine force require the maintenance
of the ability to conduct independent operations, but also require the ability to
conduct integrated operations not only with maritime forces but with air and
land forces as well.^0 The current system of separate submarine squadrons and
fleet operational control is well suited to independent submarine operations,
however it is not suited to joint integrated operations. An over-used but well-
meaning maxim in the armed forces is you fight the way you train, vet the
submarine force in the past rarely trained for joint integrated operations. How
can the need for better integrated operations be met?
One answer is to integrate the submarine into the cruiser-destroyer groups of
the surface navy community. This organization is ideally structured to provide
administrative as well as operational support to a deployable unit.^1 That is, in
^See Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, Submarine Force Vision ( [Washington, D.C.j:
Department of the Navy, 1992). The new Submarine force Vision states specifically the goal
of the Submarine Force as being to support both the National Command Authority and any
Joint Task Force Commander. The need to integrate submarines with other naval forces was
also discussed during the Cold War, see Captain John F. O'Connell, "Needed: An Innovative
Joint Naval Strategy," US Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1983, 107-109.
^See David S. Steigman, "Sea services study massive restructuring," Navy Times, 3
February 1992, 8. This article discusses the fact that Pacific Fleet units "work in combined
administrative and operational squadrons, which combine all maintenance, training and
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ideal situations, the members of destroyer squadrons train and deploy together
either as a Surface Action Group (SAG), or as members of a Carrier Battle Group
(CVBG) or an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). In the future they will deploy
together as elements of Naval Expeditionary Forces or Maritime Action Groups
(MAG).22 Integrating submarines into this structure can greatly increase the
contributions of the submarine to joint operations. From the perspective of the
submarine, it will increase its proficiency at joint integrated operations. From the
perspective of the task force, it adds a new dimension that increases the
warfighting capability of the battle group with virtually no drawbacks. The
submarine as an integral part of a battle group improves the ASW, ASUW, strike,
intelligence, surveillance, and early warning capability of the force, while
providing a covert capability that does not currently exist. This potential for
increasing the battle group's capability can only be realized if the submarine is
made an integral part of the battle group structure, operationally and
administratively. By being continually involved with attached submarines, the
naval commander becomes more aware of the capabilities of the weapons system
at his disposal, and can use it more effectively. This integration is already
underway to some extent in the Atlantic Fleet with the alignment of two attack
submarines with each permanent battle group.23 . . . From The Sea lists the
deployment functions." The proposed restructuring would incorporate this concept into all
Navy commands.
^See Department of the Navy, . . . From The Sea: The Maritime Component of the National
Military Strategy (Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Navy, 1992), 3; Vice Admiral
William Owens, "Mediterranean Fleet: A Test-bed for Navy's Future," Armed Forces Journal,
July 1992, 32-35; and Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, "Submarine Warfare - It's A-Changing,"
US Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1992, 53.





integration of attack submarines into naval expeditionary forces as a necessary
task for this new regional defense era.24
The fact that there are requirements for both independent and integrated
joint operations with different support structures does not require that the choice
of appropriate support structures for submarines be an "either/or" proposition.
The best solution may actually be a combination of the two support structures.
For the role requiring independent operations, the current system of separate
submarine squadrons and fleet operational control should be maintained. These
submarine squadrons could be renamed Submarine Strike Squadrons due to their
operational emphasis on forward offensive operations against maritime and land
targets. These submarines would be co-located with SSBN squadrons. This is
due to the similar support structures and due to the ability of strike submarines
to maintain proficiency in handling and storage of nuclear weapons (TLAM-N)
utilizing the existing support infrastructure for SSBNs. Strike submarines
deploying from these squadrons would be so named not for their specific
platform capabilities, but for their operational expertise. Figure 4 demonstrates
the global reach of these strike submarines.
24
. From The Sea, 12.
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Figure 4. The Global Reach Of Submarine-Launched




= Within 650 nmi of costal region
Source: Submarine Roles in the 1990's and Beyond (Draft)
For the role of joint integrated operations, submarines should be included in
the organization of surface squadrons/groups. A possible name for this
organization could be a Battle Force Squadron.25 Battle force submarines
deploying with these squadrons would, once again, be so named not for their
capabilities but for their operational expertise.
There are considerable advantages to dividing the organization of the
submarine force into functional elements for operational specialization. First, it
^For a discussion of battle force combatants for exclusively surface combatant s, see
Scott C. Truver, and Commander James A. Hazlett, "Surfacing a New Battle Group," US
Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1991, 91-88. A more futuristic vision of a battle force
squadron is provided by Captain Charles C. Pease, "Sink tine Navy!" LIS Naval Institute
Proceedings, September 1983, 30-36. Captain Pease discusses the construction of semi-
submersibles that would exploit the stealth advantages of submarines for self-defense.
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allows specialization as discussed earlier, and strengthens and expands the
operational capability of the battle group through experience and continuous
training. Secondly, it still provides the unified and fleet CINCs with an
independent platform that is capable of responding rapidly without regard to
commitments to other forces. It is quite probable that in the event of a major
contingency, submarines from both strike and battle force squadrons could
operate in the same general area. There would also be some overlap in
responsibilities, however the emphasis for both would be different. This would
primarily be due to the controlling authority for each submarine. In the case of
the Battle Force submarine, the emphasis would be on support of the Battle
Group, while the Strike submarine would emphasize support of CINC
requirements.
One other factor for submarine utilization is the possibility that the
submarine force may find itself in a position that it may not have enough
submarines to meet existing requirements while at the same time meeting
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) requirements. A solution to this problem would
be to utilize the two crew concept used by US SSBNs to maximize the at-sea time
for the submarines.26 This concept is expensive in terms of personnel and
maintenance costs, however, in the future it may become the only option.
To summarize, the transition of roles and missions of the submarine force
from a Cold War emphasis to a regional contingency emphasis requires a
concurrent transition in organization to effectively utilize diminishing assets.
There is a continued need for the submarine to perform as an independent unit,
^"See P. Kevin Peppe, "Centurion: The Changing Future of tine Force," US Naval
Institute Proceedings, April 1992, 60-64.
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but there is also a growing need for the submarine to perform a joint integrated
role with other maritime forces. The current organization is excellent for
independent operations but handicaps the exploitation of the full potential of
joint integrated operations. What is needed is a division of submarines into
functional elements for operational specialization. One element would retain the
current organization for support of the submarine as an independent platform
controlled by fleet or unified CINCs. The other would incorporate submarines
into the operational organization of surface forces. This would allow for the
exploitation of the submarine potential as an integral member of a battle group.
One other factor in submarine utilization relates to the two crew concept. This
concept may be required in the event that submarine mission requirements
outstrip the number of submarines available within OPTEMPO constraints in the
future.
D. CONCLUSIONS
Today, the issue of force structure in the Department of Defense is a
contentious one. The debate is ongoing not only in the Pentagon, but in the halls
of Congress as well. It is important to note that the debate over force structure
does not simply involve raw numbers of ships. It also involves the necessary
organization of the Navy to effectively utilize its diminishing assets. Efforts are
currently underway to reorganize the Navy headquarters in order to respond to
the changing national security situation. Similar efforts are being considered at
the fleet level in order to effectively integrate a smaller Navy. These efforts
should include reorganizing the submarine force into functional elements that
allow for operational specialization. This specialization will add to and
strengthen the capability of deploying battle groups by integrating submarines
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into the administrative and operational organization of cruiser-destroyer groups.
In addition, the ability of submarines to operate independently for fleet and
unified CINC disposal will be maintained using the current submarine
organization.
This chapter's discussion of force size should illuminate some important
points. The most important is that both the short term and long term factors
affecting the rate of submarine force structure reduction and the ultimate force
structure level are primarily economic and beyond the control of the Navy and
the Department of Defense. This does not imply that the Navy should cease in
stating its case in the current debate, but that it be aware of these other factors in
addition to the traditional inputs for force levels provided by the military.
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IV. FUTURE SUBMARINE DESIGN
A. INTRODUCTION
Submarine design developments are a true indication of the long term
direction of the submarine force in this time of tremendous change. Roles and
missions and force structure changes will succeed in the short term in adjusting
to major shifts in the international security environment, but these changes will
only be perpetuated in the long term if followed up by changes in submarine
design. The issue of submarine design, like the issue of force structure, has been
in the spotlight recently due to the proposed cancellation of the Seawolf attack
submarine program after procurement of only one submarine. The purpose of
this chapter is to assess the design issues that need to be addressed to support the
submarine force of the post-Cold War world. These issues include the factors
affecting the transition from a Cold War emphasis to a regional warfare
emphasis, and the factors affecting the long term strategy for submarine design
and development.
B. SHORT TERM OR TRANSITION REQUIREMENTS
The current state of affairs surrounding the Seawolf class submarine and its
apparent successor, the Centurion, will dominate the short term requirements for
submarine design. Factors that will affect these requirements are the submarine
industrial base issue, affordability, the transition to a regional emphasis on
submarine design, and Russian concerns over construction of the Seawolf.
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1. The Submarine Industrial Base
The time table for production of the follow-on submarine, tentatively
called Centurion, will depend mainly on the outcome of the study on the
submarine industrial base. If this study determines that the submarine industrial
base is in danger of collapsing due to the cancellation of the Seawolf program,
then it will require the earliest construction of the new submarine. Conversely, if
the industrial base study determines that a temporary hiatus can be successfully
weathered, then the construction date will probably be pushed back. The reason
that the construction of the follow-on submarine will be so closely tied to the
submarine industrial base issue is the fact that the submarine force can not
currently justify its current force size on existing requirements. There is no need
to construct new submarines beyond those already under construction in this
decade to meet projected force size requirements. 1
The time table for construction will have a significant impact on the
amount of change that can be incorporated into the new submarine design. A
compressed time table will necessitate the use of existing "off the shelf"
technology that borrows heavily from the designs of previous submarines with
their emphasis on Cold War missions.2 An extended time table will allow for
'This is based on an assumed force requirement of 60 submarines or less by the end of
the century. Given mat the submarine force currently has 84 submarines with 14 still under
construction, there is no demonstrated need for any additional construction to support a force
of 60 boats. See also Donald C. Daniel, Beyond the 600-Ship Navy. Adelphi Paper 261
(London: Brassey's for International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991), 35; "In short, if there
is any one warship type in the circa 2000 inventory whose numbers seem unambiguously
ample for regional contingencies, it is the general-purpose submarine."
^This is in fact what is shaping up to be the requirement for Centurion. See "Acquisition
Board Approves Concept Phase For Navy's Centurion Submarine," Inside the Navy, 24 August
1992, 3. "As a way of reducing the cost of the Centurion, the attack submarine will
incorporate technologies from Los Angeles Class and Trident ballistic-missile submarines, the
report said."
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more integration of new design features that will meet the requirements for a
regional warfighting submarine. The issue of the submarine industrial base will
be the primary driver for short term submarine design.
2. Affordability
Closely related to the issue of the submarine industrial base is the issue
of affordability. The Seawolf program is primarily a casualty of economics. It is
not a difficult task to argue that the Seawolf would be a viable program today,
though significantly scaled back, if it was perceived as an affordable weapon
system. 3 What had been perceived as affordable in the Cold War is no longer
tolerable in the immediate post-Cold War world. The short term design
requirements of the new submarine will be heavily influenced by the need to
construct a capable submarine that is affordable as measured by the new post-
Cold War frame of reference. This has been described as in the cost range of the
improved 688 class submarine ($1.6 billion for first ship), but with an improved
capability.^ This emphasis on affordability began to appear with the design
process of the Seawolf, however, its overriding impact is something new to the
^Senator John McCain, an opponent of the Seawolf, has stated many times that his
opposition to the program is based on more pressing needs for the funds in other defense
programs. See Congress, Senate, Senator McCain of Arizona speaking on an Amendment to
terminate the Seawolf program, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record (26 September
1991), 13752-61; and Senator McCain of Arizona speaking on an Amendment to rescind
funds for the Seawolf program, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (5 May 1992),
5960-62 and 5972-76.
^See the comments of Ronald O'Rourke in "Address to tine Submarine Technology
Symposium, 13 May 1992," Tlie Sidvnarine Review 0uly 1992): 37-40, or "Second Luncheon
Address," in Proceedings of the Fifth Submarine Technology Symposium (U), 12-14 May 1992, by
the Naval Submarine League and Johns Hopkins University - Applied Physics Laboratory
(Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University - Applied Phvsics Laboratory, 1992), 21-30,
JHU/APLSTD-R-2121.
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process.^ It requires the reorientation of the submarine industrial base towards
the goal of not only providing a product that is more capable, but one that is
affordable as well. "The challenge for industry is not to make submarines more
capable and quieter but rather to find ways to reduce prices without sacrificing
our technological edge. This is not a minor challenge and will take our best and
brightest. "6 The obvious motivation for doing this is provided by the fact that
the virtual survival of the submarine industrial base hangs in the balance.
3. Transition to Regional Warfighting Emphasis
In order for the new submarine to be accepted for procurement, in
addition to meeting affordability goals, it must be seen as meeting the new
requirements for conducting regional warfare. This must be done in order to
prevent a repetition of the arguments made against the Seawolf program, namely
that it was too costly and was a Cold War weapon system. This regional
warfighting capability and its resulting design requirements will be discussed
more fully in the following section. In general, however, the need to design for
conducting regional warfare requires an emphasis on littoral warfighting
capability, such as shallow water operations, strike warfare, and special
operations, and a deemphasis on open ocean warfare, particularly ASW against a
Soviet threat. This is not to say that the submarine should shed one capability in
^One discussion of Seawolf submarine design technology is the Government Accounting
Office, "Submarine Technology," Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Projection Forces and
Regional Defense, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO,
1990).
"James J. Tritten, "Address to the Submarine Technology Symposium, 12 May 1992," The
Submarine Review (July 1992): 25, or "Chairman's Remarks and Paper - The Submarine's Role
in Future Naval Warfare," in Proceedings of the Fifth Submarine Technology Symposium(U), 12-14
May 1992, by the Naval Submarine League and Johns Hopkins University - Applied Physics
Laboratory (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University - Applied Thysics Laboratory, 1992), 45-
60,JHU/APLSTD-R-2121.
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favor of another. In fact, the submarine capabilities will change minimally. The
major changes will occur in emphasis on strengthening and improving specific
capabilities.
4. Russian Concerns over Construction of the Seawolf.
Though what remains of the Soviet Union has rapidly receded from US
consideration as a threat, it can not be ignored altogether. The military still
wields considerable power in the republics. The Soviet Navy has been primarily
transferred intact to the Russian republic. Due to the enormous capabilities of
the Seawolf submarine and due to its obvious design for operations against the
Soviet Union, continued construction of Seawolf could send the wrong signal to
military authorities in Russia. By suspending construction of the Seawolf, and
proceeding with construction of a submarine that is designed for regional (not
anti-Russian) warfare, the US can remove possible justification for excessive
military expenditures by the Russian republic.
In summary, submarine design in the short term will be affected
primarily by issues unrelated to military utility- The primary factor affecting
design will be the issue of the submarine industrial base. The reason that the
construction of the follow-on submarine will be so closely tied to the submarine
industrial base issue is the fact that the submarine force can not justify its current
force size on existing requirements. The industrial base issue will determine
when the new submarine must be constructed in order to maintain the viability
of the industrial base. This time factor will determine the magnitude of change
that can be included in the new submarine design. A second related factor will
be affordability. The need to provide a submarine that is both capable and
affordable is vital to ensure that the US will continue to field a submarine force
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that is similar to the one that exists today. Related to this factor is the ability of
the new submarine design to incorporate changes that increase the regional
warfighting capability of the submarine. This in addition to the issue of
affordability is vital to overcoming the stigma that submarines are too expensive
and designed solely for the Cold War. These three factors are distinct but
interrelated. They reflect the short term requirement of submarine design as that
of maintaining the capability of the submarine as a weapons system for the
United States through the production of a capable but affordable submarine that
ensures the viability of the submarine industrial base. The short term
requirement is not that of maintaining submarine force structure, which is
shrinking. A final factor in the short term is the perceived affect of continued
Seazvolf production on the Russian republic. The US can not afford to send the
wrong signal to military authorities in Russia as that republic struggles to
institute democratic and free market reforms.
C. LONG TERM STRATEGY
The long term strategy for submarine design procurement must be specific
enough to deal with the apparent directions of the current international security
environment, but at the same time be general enough to deal with the inexactness
of predicting the future. As a result this section will be concerned with the
general design features that must be addressed in the new design submarine for
regional warfighting, and the need to maintain flexibility in submarine
capability.
1. Design of the Regional Warfighting Submarine
The enormous changes in the international environment and the many
misperceptions associated with the Seawolf program require that a long term
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view of submarine design not be limited to evolutionary improvements upon
existing US submarines. In order to avoid the stigma of being stuck in the Cold
War, the Navy must start from virtually scratch in its design approach to a
regional warfighting submarine. Issues that must be addressed include the
propulsion system, weapons capability, sensors and electronics, and the platform
itself. These issues must be understood to be constrained by economics, as
discussed in the previous section. Affordability, in a period of no distinct global
threat, will remain one of the highest priorities in submarine procurement.
a. Propulsion System
Since the advent of nuclear propulsion for submarines, the debate
over the propulsion system for US submarines has been fierce and rancorous/
This debate appeared to have been resolved during the 1980s as the superior
capability of the nuclear submarine was demonstrated and as the US submarine
force began to retire its last diesel submarines. This new era requires an
examination of alternate methods of propulsion to nuclear power. The reasons
behind this include the increasing potential of Air Independent Propulsion (AIP),
and the perception that nuclear propulsion is prohibitively expensive.
The Navy has stated its position for many years that nuclear
propulsion is the desired propulsion system for submarines. The reasons for this
position include increased speed, endurance, firepower, and sensor capability-^
'Examples of this debate include, Commander Daniel Conley, Royal Navy, "Don't
Discount the Diesel," US Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1987, 74-81; Vice Admiral N. R.
Thunman, "Diesel Submarines for the U.S. Navy?" US Naval Institute Proceedings, August
1985, 136-7; and Commander John L. Byron, "Diesel Boats Forever?" US Naval Institute
Proceedings, December 1982, 35-42.
"Department of the Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare),
Submarine Roles in the 1990's and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Navy, 18
January 1992), 5-6.
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These attributes are needed for the US submarine force because of the unique
roles and missions assigned to it. These roles and missions are those that are
concerned with regional warfare, namely rapid and sustained response with a
multimission capability. 9 These attributes are not necessarily needed for
submarines of other countries, such as the Third World or European countries,
due to the coastal defense roles of their submarine forces.
Air Independent Propulsion has shown increasing promise as a
means of providing another method for submarines to sever their dependence on
the surface of the ocean. These AIP systems utilize systems that are closed-cycle
and thus do not require a continuous flow of air to operate. 10 This technology
deserves considerable attention by the United States both as a potential
replacement for nuclear propulsion and as a potential threat if utilized by
countries whose interests conflict with ours. A number of factors will affect the
future of AIP as a design feature in future US submarines. The first is that this
technology must demonstrate that it is comparable to nuclear power in terms of
providing sustained speed, and endurance for a platform capable of conducting
regional warfare missions. To date, this has not been demonstrated. Second, in
order for the United States to shift its propulsion means from nuclear power to
AIP, it must be affordable. Currently there appears to be difficulty in developing
an effective AIP system that will compete in costs with contemporary diesel
"See Vice Admiral Roger Bacon, "Q & A with Vice Adm. Roger Bacon," interview by
Richard Lawson, Inside the Navy, 24 August 1992, 8. "Five studies in the last 12 years have
confirmed mat conventionally powered submarines do not fit with the U.S. global military
strategy. Nuclear power gives us the ability to maintain forward [presence! and respond to
regional crises quickly."
-^For a good summary of advances in AIF see Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990).
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submarine propulsion systems. It is unlikely in the near term that AIP can cost
effectively compete with nuclear power for the propulsion requirements for US
submarines.
Given that AIP is still in the development stages, another alternative
is to utilize existing diesel submarines technology for future US submarines.
This alternative will require a fundamental change in not only submarine roles
and missions, but in submarine basing as well. As discussed previously, current
submarine roles and missions require a submarine that has high speed,
endurance, and the electric power generating capability to support advanced
weapons systems.
Current diesel technology, though potent and capable, clearly falls
short in the endurance requirement. This shortcoming can be overcome by the
use of forward basing of US diesel submarines, such as was done in the past.
This new requirement for forward basing appears to run contrary to current
trends in US defense policy. That policy involves the closing of significant
military bases abroad. A policy of forward basing US diesel submarines in the
future provides the potential for disagreement between the host country and the
United States over the use of its submarine in a regional conflict or crisis. This
may in effect limit the flexibility of using the submarine as an instrument for
signaling or gunboat diplomacy. One possible solution is the use of US
submarine tenders located in international waters as portable bases for diesel
submarines. This option, too, may impact on the roles and missions of the
submarine and on the ability of the submarine to conduct covert operations.
The possibility of using conventional diesel technology for US
submarines appears to be based more upon desires to achieve economic rewards
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than for providing an effective weapons system. It is a possibility, however, and
should not be dismissed out of hand. Instead, the possible drawbacks must be
outlined, explained and weighed against the possible economic benefits oi such a
decision.H
b. Weapons Capability
The regional warfighting submarine will be concerned primarily
with littoral warfare. 12 This puts an emphasis on power projection ashore, the
capability to conduct shallow water sea denial against surface ships and
submarines, and near shore covert operations, such as intelligence collection,
surveillance, and special operations. During the Cold War, the emphasis for
weapons was on the heavy torpedo capable of destroying or disabling a fast,
deep-diving nuclear submarine in the open ocean. One of the cost effective
criteria for this new regional warfighting submarine will be its weapons load out
per unit cost. A related criteria for the Navy or a unified CINC is the firepower
or rate of fire of the submarine. 13 These criteria taken together point to the
development of a cruise missile submarine that retains the capability to launch
•'•'This discussion is in fact in progress as a result of the Centurion Acquisition Decision
Memorandum. It specifically requires that the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
(COEA) for the Centurion include as an option a conventionally powered submarine,
including the possible overseas basing of these submarines. See "Yockey Grabs Tight Control
of Navy's Nest-Generation Submarine Design Studies," and "Centurion Acquisition Decision
Memorandum," Inside The Navy, 7 September 1992, 1 and 7-9; and Robert Holzer, "Centurion
Sub Study to Add Diesels," Defense News, 21-27 September 1992, 3 and 37.
'•'-Much of this section is based on insights provided by a recent Joint Staff study on
submarines in regional warfare, see Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Deputy Director for
Assessment/J8, "Final Report," Potent Striker 1 ([Washington, DC.]: US Department of
Defense, 1992).
-^See "Centurion Design Places Great Emphasis On Ability To Deliver Tomahawk
Missiles," and "Navy Report on the New Attack Submarine (Unclassified Version):
Executive Summary," Inside The Navy, 27 July 1992, 1 and 8-15.
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torpedoes. This is a fundamental shift in weapons capability emphasis for
submarines that in the past relied primarily on heavy torpedoes as the weapon of
choice. 14 One other weapon for regional defense will be the "proportional
response" weapon capable of disabling vice destroying vessels engaged in
weapons or drug smuggling, minelaying, or piracy. The need for a high
firepower rate requires the use of missile launchers such as the \~LS tubes on
improved 688 class submarines or possibly the addition of a modular missile bay
to the hull similar to those used for ballistic missile submarines. The kev for the
design of the regional warfighting submarine is to emphasize those weapons that
will most likely be used. In this case, those weapons are cruise missiles, either
land or sea attack variants. Additionally the weapons load out capability should
be significant to make the platform more cost effective, while at the same time
providing a firepower rate that meets the requirements of the unified CFNCs.
c. Sensors and Electronic Capability
With the emphasis on littoral warfare and support of joint integrated
operations, this category should be the focus of intensive research and
development to increase submarine capability. In the past, this category has
focused on increasing the sensors and electronic capability of the submarine in
relation to its ASW mission. For regional warfare increased emphasis should be
placed on expanding the submarine's battle space, and providing connectivity
between the submarine and other forces.
The submarine's battle space in a regional warfare context is
currently limited by its environment and its ability to use off hull sensors. Due to
-^This fundamental shift appears to be recognized by the submarine force, see Vice
Admiral Roger F. Bacon, "Submarine Warfare - It's A-Changing," US Naval Institute
Proceedmgs, June 1992, 52.
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the revolutionary improvements made in US submarine design in terms of
quieting and sonar sensors, the future US submarine's underwater horizon will
be limited not by its sensors or the self-noise of the submarine, but by the limits
of the environment itself. In shallow water areas, the acoustical environment can
be very limiting. Above the surface of the water, the submarine's visual and, to
some extent, electronic horizon is limited by the physical proportions of the
sensor, namely the height of the mast, rather than by the technology of the
equipment. Thus, it appears that the submarine may have reached its limit in
expanding its battlespace through its own organic sensors. 15 There is still room
for improvement, especially in incorporating new fiber optic and low observable
technologies to submarine mast. However, these design improvements will
serve simply to improve the quality of the data within the submarine's battle
space, rather than expanding it.
How, then, can the submarine expand its battle space? The answer
lies in exploiting off-hull sensors, in particular, the use of unmanned underwater
vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). UUVs can be either
expendable or retrievable, tethered or non-tethered. These could be used in a
shallow water environment be for mine detection/ avoidance, against quiet diesel
submarines for detection, decoy or attack, and for navigation in restricted or
uncharted waters. UAVs will have similar roles to those envisioned for UAVs
used off of surface ships. These include naval gunfire support, target
-^This realization appears to be reflected in the final report of the Defense Department's
Science and Technology Strategy, which omitted "almost all references to tine Navy's future
attack submarine as part of a top-level demonstration needed for the technical areas called
"Sea Control and Undersea Superiority."" Instead a "philosophical change" has occurred
emphasizing more off-platform sensors. See '"Philosophical Change' Lessens Role of
Submarine as Technology Demonstrator," Inside the Navy, 3 August 1992, 1.
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identification, third-party terminal guidance for precision guided munitions, and
reconnaissance. These UAVs may not be for the sole use of the submarine. The
submarine may simply be the best platform for launching the UAV and may
"hand off" control of the UAV to some other platform. Similarly, the submarine
may assume control of a UAV in order to assist other forces in the region.
The ability to utilize these unmanned vehicles assumes the
submarine has the ability to maintain reliable communications links with these
systems. In addition to the requirement for communications with these systems,
the regional warfare submarine will also be required to maintain reliable
communications with all other forces in the region in order to be an effective
contributor. This emphasis on connectivity with other maritime forces is
something new to the submarine force. In fact, the inability of the submarine to
communicate effectively with other naval forces has been used as an argument
against integrating submarines into battle groups. In this new era of regional
warfare, this communications stumbling block must be overcome. There are a
number of programs underway to increase the connectivity of submarines with
other forces. This should become a priority in order to ensure the regional
warfare submarine can contribute its full potential to the US regional warfighting
capability. 16
d. Platform
This issue involves primarily the direction to be taken in platform
development. This is one design category that lends itself quite well to
evolutionary development from previous designs. The basis of the submarine
'^For a discussion of submarine communications capabilities and recommendations for
the future see Captain Robert Carlin, "Communicating with the Silent Service," US Naval
Institute Proceedings, December 1981, 75-78.
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defense is its ability to remain undetected. This ability precludes the expenditure
of resources to strengthen the hull against battle damage, and for the
procurement of point-defense weapons like anti-torpedo torpedoes. Maintaining
the current US advantage in submarine quieting ensures that the weapons
carried by the submarine are primarily offensive in nature. Current US
submarine design has reached the point that the submarine is virtually as quiet
or quieter than its environment, particularly in shallow water. This design
feature, coupled with other measures that reduce the detectability of submarine
through active sonar or other means, should not be sacrificed in order to achieve
cost savings. Instead, this capability should be seen as a baseline performance
criteria. The emphasis on design for the platform should be to maintain this
baseline while simultaneously reducing the costs to achieve it. By maintaining
the submarine's strength as a stealthy, covert weapons system, this allows
resources to be allocated to increasing the submarine's offensive capabilities vice
creating new defensive capabilities.
2. Flexibility in Submarine Capability
Looking at the history of the development of the submarine as a
weapons system, it is significant to note its ability to adapt to changing
international events. 1' The submarine has adjusted its role many times this
century. Each time that the international situation changed, the submarine
changed with it to meet emerging requirements. Even while doing so, the
submarine retained its abilities developed for the previous situation. Thus, the
submarine developed as a weapon against surface ships, but progressively
improved its capability to include anti-submarine warfare, special operations,
*' Potent Striker, Enclosure 2.
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surveillance, intelligence collection, and finally strike warfare. It is important to
draw a lesson from this history. While the international system has changed to
necessitate a change in emphasis on submarine design, it does not require that
the submarine automatically eliminate other capabilities. To do so may prevent
the submarine from adapting to the next major international change which will
inevitably occur during the design lifetime of the next generation submarine.
There are a number of options to maintain submarine design flexibility.
The first option is that which has been used in the past, to incorporate the same
capabilities into all submarine classes. The second is to break from the past and
build two or more classes of submarines that meet different requirements. This
approach is similar to the arguments in the 1980s over aircraft carrier
procurement. There was a debate over the issue of building small numbers of
huge aircraft carriers when one could build a larger number of smaller carriers
for the same price. In the case of the submarine force, there would be two or
more classes of submarines built simultaneously. The first and most numerous
class would be the regional warfighting submarine that emphasizes littoral
warfare capabilities and minimizes, or possibly eliminates, open ocean warfare
capabilities. The second class of submarines would emphasize multimission
capability across the warfare spectrum. This would provide a baseline design
from which the submarine force could rapidly adapt to changing international
events such as an emergent global threat. For instance, this design could provide
the platform for a follow?-on to the Trident ballistic missile submarine if a
significant threat necessitates it. Similarly, this design could be used to
reconstitute a true open-ocean ASW capability rapidly.
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A third option for maintaining submarine design flexibility is the use of
modular construction. This approach would involve the design of a basic
submarine that would possess necessary platform characteristics as discussed
previously. This basic submarine would then be modified to suit existing or
perceived needs for the unified CINCs. These needs would include those for
regional warfighting, open-ocean ASW, or strategic nuclear deterrence. These
needs would be satisfied by constructing the required number of submarines
with these pre-designed modular warfare "packages" installed. 1°
Obviously, the issue of submarine design flexibility in the short term is a
moot one due to the current evolutionary design process of submarines. In the
future, however, desires to concentrate solely on regional warfare coupled with
the need to maintain affordability may overwhelm the need to maintain
submarine design flexibility. One solution is to build limited numbers of true
multimission submarines in conjunction with regional warfighting submarines.
Another option is to apply modular construction techniques to a basic submarine
design.
D. CONCLUSIONS
To summarize this chapter, the issue of submarine design is currently a hot
topic due to the decision to cancel the Seawolf submarine program. Besides the
current political arguments, submarine design is important because it reflects the
long term direction of the submarine force. Because of the rapid pace of both
international and domestic events, the issue of submarine design must be looked
at from short term and long term perspectives.
*°See "Modular Submarines Among Options for 2010," Navy Times, 7 October 7 1991.
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Submarine design in the short term will be affected primarily by issues
unrelated to military utility. The primary factor affecting design will be the issue
of the submarine industrial base. The reason that the construction of the follow-
on submarine will be so closely tied to the submarine industrial base issue is the
fact that the submarine force can not currently justify its current force size on
existing requirements. The industrial base issue will determine when the new
submarine must be constructed in order to maintain the viability of the industrial
base. This time factor will determine the magnitude of change that can be
included in the new submarine design. A second related factor will be
affordability. The need to provide a submarine that is both capable and
affordable is vital to ensure that the US will continue to field a submarine force
that is similar to the one that exists today. Related to this factor is the ability of
the new submarine design to incorporate changes that increase the regional
warfighting capability of the submarine. This in addition to the issue of
affordability is vital to overcoming the stigma that submarines are too expensive
and designed solely for the Cold War. These three factors are distinct but
interrelated. They reflect the short term requirement of submarine design as that
of maintaining the capability of the submarine as a weapons system for the
United States through the production of a capable but affordable submarine that
ensures the viability of the submarine industrial base. The short term
requirement is not that of maintaining submarine force structure, which is
shrinking. A final factor in the short term is the perceived affect of continued
Seawolf production on the Russian republic. The US can not afford to send the
wrong signal to military authorities in Russia as that republic struggles to
institute democratic and free market reforms.
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In the long term, the approach to submarine design must make minimal
assumptions in order to deflect criticism that it is stuck in the Cold War. It must
concentrate on the areas needed to produce a regional warfighting submarine.
This includes a return to the issue of submarine propulsion. AIP as a potential
propulsion means for submarines should not be ruled out in the future. The
critical factors that AIP must be able to meet are speed, endurance, and
affordability in comparison to nuclear propulsion. Conventional or diesel
propulsion is also an option, however, it has distinct disadvantages compared to
nuclear propulsion. These disadvantages would require a fundamental
adjustment of submarine roles and missions and a policy of forward basing that
appears to run contrary to current developments.
The regional warfighting submarine must have a design emphasis on those
weapons that will be used in joint littoral warfare. This translates into the ability
to carry large numbers of cruise missiles and fire them rapidly. In addition, the
need for carrying large numbers of heavy torpedoes will be significantly
reduced. One other consideration is the development of a "proportional
response" weapon capable of disabling, vice destroying, vessels engaging in
drug/weapon smuggling, minelaying, or piracy. These are fundamental changes
from past submarine design requirements.
In order for the submarine to be an effective contributor to a regional conflict,
it must be able to expand and dominate its battlespace and maintain contact with
other forces. The current battlespace of the submarine appears to be platform
limited. As a result in order to expand the battlespace further requires the use of
unmanned vehicles. These vehicles can be used either underwater or in the air in
order to vastly improve the submarine's horizon and its effect on the conflict.
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The need for the submarine to maintain contact with other forces is paramount in
this new emerging era of joint combined operations. If the regional warfighting
submarine does not have the means to communicate effectively and consistently
with other forces, it cannot justify a major role in regional warfare.
The extent of submarine platform design appears to have reached its zenith
with the Seawolf program. The submarine's best defense is its ability to remain
undetected. As a result, the current performance characteristics of US
submarines should be maintained as a baseline, while research and development
should focus on the means to maintain the performance while reducing costs.
Finally, in the rush to redirect the submarine design process towards a
regional warfighting emphasis, it is important to note the historical development
of submarine design. Throughout its relatively brief history, the submarine has
been able to adapt to tremendous changes in the international environment. This
is due to its flexibility in design. While additions were made in submarine
capability, old capabilities were maintained. The result has been a multimission
capable platform that is flexible enough to respond to the demands of the post-
Cold War world. In designing the regional warfighting submarine of the future,
there are three options to ensure that design flexibility is maintained. One is to
continue current practice and design a multipurpose platform capable of
operating across the spectrum of conflict. A second option is to design two
classes of submarine, one to deal with the specific requirements of regional
warfare, the other to maintain design flexibility and multipurpose,
multispectrum capability. Another option is to apply modular construction
techniques to a basic submarine design.
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The short term issue of submarine design appears to be taking center stage
due to the concerns over the submarine industrial issue. It is important that the
Navy also take a long term view of submarine design and confront the issues that
need to be faced in the transition to a regional warfighting capability. It appears
that the Seawolf submarine program is being seen as the transition to the post-
Cold War era, and the Centurion program will be the first post-Cold War
submarine. Looking at this issue objectively, it will be very difficult for the
Centurion to completely divorce itself from many Cold War design
characteristics simply due to the short period of time that will be required for
actual construction of the first ship. Using the Centurion project as a springboard,
the Navy should begin concurrent development of a regional warfighting
submarine that will begin production in the early 21st century in order to replace




This thesis has discussed the dramatic changes that have occurred in the
international security environment and the resulting response of the United
States to meet the new and emerging challenges of the post-Cold War world.
These changes have led to the development of a regional defense strategy 1,
which has implications on every military service and warfare community. In
regards to these implications, submarine roles and missions, force structure, and
design have been addressed. These three issues are interrelated. Roles and
missions must be the first to change in order to meet the new demands of the
regional defense strategy. Force structure must be addressed to allow the
submarine force to best complete its assigned roles and missions. Submarine
design is important for the future in adapting more fully to the needs of the
regional defense strategy. These three issues are important and vital to the
continued contribution of the submarine to supporting US national security
interests.
Just as important, however, is the way the submarine force presents itself in
the continuing debate over the shape of the future US military. In this post-Cold
War world, the rules have changed in the national security debate. If the
submarine force expects to contribute to the post-Cold War world, it will have to
See President, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C. : GPO,
1991); General Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy 1992 (Washington D.C : GPO,
January 1992); and Department of the Navy, . . . From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Servicefor
the 21st Century (Washington D.C. : US Department of the Navy, 30 September 1992).
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change as well. Specifically, the submarine force must change its frame of
reference, take the "silent" out of the silent service, and aggressively engage the
Congress in the decision making process for submarine issues.
B. ESTABLISHING THE PROPER FRAME OF REFERENCE
In a time of tremendous change, the initial reaction to external pressures on
an institution is to resist efforts to alter the status quo. This reaction is even more
pronounced when the status quo has been shaped and maintained over a forty
year period. Thus, every recommendation to change is seen as a major battle that
will affect the survival of the entire institution. In this type of environment,
rational management of change rapidly degenerates into crisis management to
resist change.
As the Cold War came to a close, virtually every segment of the defense
establishment from the top levels of the Defense Department down to the
individual services fell into this pattern. As the Soviet Union rapidly
disintegrated before our eyes, attempts were made to identify other sources of
threats that could restore the comfortable Cold War justification of defense
expenditures. Even after it became obvious that the Soviet Union was collapsing,
top officials of the Defense Department and the individual services were still
justifying their budgets on the Soviet threat.^
The behavior of the submarine community is a good example of these efforts.
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, and amid calls for decreased defense
spending and growing concerns over the costs of the Seawolf program, Navy
^See Paul N. Stockton, "The Congressional Response," in Reconstituting America's Defense:
The New U.S. National Security Strategy, ed. James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1992), 69-74.
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officials sought to justify procurement of Seawolf and the maintenance of a large
attack submarine force based on an effort to emphasize the growing threat of
diesel submarines. This effort became transparent upon closer examination. In
addition to this, attention was focused on the unabated construction rates of
Soviet submarines. Soon it became obvious that this trend was the result of
inertia rather than a calculated effort on Soviet authorities. The result of these
seemingly frantic efforts was to damage the credibility of the submarine force
and to reinforce the misperceptions that the submarine was solely an anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) weapon and that it was an obsolete Cold War
weapon. 3
There are a number of lessons to be gained from this initial experience with
the post-Cold War defense debate. The first is that a significant effort must be
made to rebuild the credibility of the submarine community and to correct the
misperceptions about the utility of the submarine in the post-Cold War world.
The second lesson is that the rules have changed in the defense debate and the
submarine force needs to comprehend these changes and adapt its behavior in
the post-Cold War defense debate.
The first step in changing directions for the submarine force is to establish a
new frame of reference that is more applicable to the current environment. The
Cold War provided the military services with an environment that had a
consistent global threat. This environment provided a "safety net" for the
warfare communities in that there was no debate over the purpose for specific
^See Ronald O'Rourke, "Address to the Submarine Technology Symposium, 13 May
1992," The Submarine Review (July 1992): 31-32, or, "Second Luncheon Address," Proceedings
of the Fifth Submarine Technology Symposium (U), 12-14 May 1992 (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins
University - Applied Physics Laboratory, 1992), 21-30, JHU/APL STD-R-2121.
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forces. There was consensus all around for the need for significant military
forces to defend against the Soviet Union. This consensus allowed the debate to
center around lower level issues such as force structure and research and
development. In this environment, each issue could be seen as a separate battle.
In the post-Cold War world, the defense debate is radically different. The
debate has shifted away from the individual issues and up to the justification of
forces. Thus, we see significant debate on the need for B-2 bombers, nuclear
ballistic missiles, and attack submarinesA This shift in focus in the defense debate
requires a concurrent shift in the way the submarine force presents its
arguments. The focus should shift away from individual issues such as roles and
missions and force structure, and shift towards justification of the need for the
submarine in the United States military. The submarine force must construct a
vision that incorporates the individual issues into a coherent package that fits
neatly into the new concept of national security. 5 The relevant issues for the
submarine force should be discussed not from the aspect of "is this good for the
submarine force?," but rather from the perspective of "how does this contribute
to national security?" This frame of reference if utilized with vigor, will help to
restore credibility to the submarine force on current issues and will dovetail well
with the current transformation of the military that was started with the new
National Security Strategy of the United States.
^An example of this debate is the Air Force's attempt to justify the existence of the B-2
bomber by citing its potential as a conventional bomber.
-^This is James L. George's point for the vision of tine Department of the Navy in, "A
Strategy in the Navy's Best Interest," US Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1991, 114-123. See
also Admiral Sir Julian Oswald, "Security Has New Meaning," US Naval Institute Proceedings,
May 1992, 51. "[W]e in the militarv must warmly embrace wider concepts: not just defense,
narrowly defined, but security, widely interpreted."
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C. TAKING THE "SILENT" OUT OF THE SILENT SERVICE
For years the submarine service has been shrouded in secrecy. The need for
secrecy and reticence to discuss operations was a necessary fact during the Cold
War. The need for the same level of secrecy is no longer apparent in this new
post-Cold War era and may in fact harm the submarine force in its efforts to
participate in the defense debate. The focus of this new openness should be on
providing the evidence necessary to prove that the submarine is in fact a capable
weapons system for the regional defense strategy. This could be done through
selective declassification of past submarine operations, similar declassification
and promotion of submarine capabilities, and emphasis on the relative
invulnerability of submarines.
Due to the shroud oi secrecy surrounding all US submarine operations
during the Cold War, few outside the Navy truly understand the capabilities and
potential of the submarine as an instrument of national security. Now, in order
to defend itself fairly in the defense debate, the submarine force must selectively
declassify its operations and demonstrate to the other services and to the public
the true potential of submarines. 6 The term "selectively declassify" is chosen
with a purpose. Just as the secrecy surrounding Cold War operations will hinder
efforts to justify the submarine, so too will excessive attention to past exploits of
US submarines. It is not appropriate to reveal details of US submarine
operations against the Soviet Union. This is due to the need to foster better
relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union, and due to the fact that
those operations were generally in support of a strategy that is no longer
"Vice Admiral Roger Bacon, "Q & A with Vice Adm. Roger Bacon," interview by Richard
Lawson, Inside the Navy, 24 August 1992, 7. "We are trying to look at some of the regional
crises and declassify aspects of operations where submarines have been involved."
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relevant. Concentrating on operations against the Soviet Union, thus, will only
perpetuate the myths that the submarine is a relic of the Cold War, and only
capable of performing ASW. But throughout the Cold War, US submarines were
involved in regional contingencies unrelated to the Soviet Union. These
operations should be the focus of declassification efforts and should strengthen
the arguments to be made about the utility of the submarine in regional warfare
and crises. These operations include those of submarines during the Vietnam
War, during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Libyan crises, and during crises in
Lebanon/
Related to the efforts to declassify relevant submarine operations, is the need
to be more open about submarine capabilities. This will serve two purposes.
First, it will help to correct misperceptions that the submarine is only an effective
weapon against other submarines. Second, it will contribute to the forward
presence potential of the submarine. If the capabilities of US submarines are
well-known and publicized, then their effectiveness as instruments of naval
diplomacy are greatly increased. A country that is involved in a dispute with the
United States, may be more affected by the announcement of the presence of US
submarines off of its coast if it understands more clearly what the capabilities of
that submarine are. There are a number of ways to increase awareness of
submarine capabilities. One method that merits considerable improvement is
through the media. There have been efforts to increase media coverage of
submarine operations. These efforts, however, have been hampered by a lack of
'Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, "Submarine Warfare: It's A-Changing," US Naval
Institute Proceedings, June 1992, 52. "Submarines have operated in support of nearly every
regional conflict or crisis faced by this nation in the past 50 years, including the Korean War,
Vietnam, Grenada, Lebanon, and Libva, as well as Desert Shield and Desert Storm."
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direction and a continued unwillingness to discuss submarine operations
openly. ° As a result, we see news articles and broadcasts on submarines that
deal almost exclusively with the personnel and ignore the regional warfighting
capabilities that the submarine has to offer. This approach to public relations
must be reevaluated.^
The final point of emphasis for the submarine force should be in illuminating
the enormous comparative advantage now possessed by the United States in
terms of submarine technology. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union
expended enormous resources in attempting to neutralize the threat of US
submarines. They were never successful. Now, in this new international
security environment, there is no country that possesses either the resources or
the technological know-how to sustain its efforts to counter the submarine
threat. 10 Thus, we find ourselves in a position that US submarines will remain
relatively invulnerable for the foreseeable future. This comparative advantage
should not be carelessly discarded or allowed to atrophy-
D. ENGAGING THE CONGRESS IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS
The Constitution of the United States endows Congress with the
responsibility to maintain the Navy. During the Cold War, the submarine
community was able to receive support for its programs without dealing with a
° See O'Rourke, "Address to the Submarine Technology Symposium, 13 May 1992," 32-
33, or, "Second Luncheon Address," 21-30.
9Ibid.
-"^This statement excludes NATO allies and the Soviet Union, see Donald C. Daniel,
Beyond the 600-Ship Navy. Adelphi Paper 261 (London: Brassey's for International Institute of
Strategic Studies, 1991), 34. "Only the Soviet Union, and possibly tine UK, have a sufficient
capability to pose a sustained challenge to US submarine operations in specific areas or
circumstances."
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large number of Congressional members. This was due to the environment
created by the Cold War consensus. Now that the Cold War is over, this
consensus has evaporated, and the submarine force suddenly finds itself without
broad support.H As a result, the submarine force has come under increasing
attack from members of Congress on the individual issues of submarine
procurement, submarine force structure, and submarine roles and missions. This
new environment necessitates that the submarine force shed its insular ways and
actively engage the Congress in the initial steps of the decision making process.
By doing so and by emphasizing the need to stay above individual issues and
focus on a larger vision, it is possible to deflect individual attacks on specific
issues and at the same time build a broad base of support for the submarine
force. 12
Involving Congress in the decision making process of the submarine force
may appear to be surrendering to outside interference. During the Cold War,
this might have been the case. Now in this new environment, such a policy of
Congressional engagement is vital to ensure that the submarine force receives its
fair consideration in the defense debate. If the submarine force instead chooses
to remain aloof, Congress will still become actively involved in the process. The
only difference will be that it will be a Congress that is probably hostile to
submarine interests, and that will be making decisions on individual submarine
issues rather than based on a broader vision of the submarine force as a whole.
*
-'•O'Rourke, "Address to the Submarine Technology Symposium, 13 May 1992," 35, or,
"Second Luncheon Address," 21-30.
-*- AD'Rourke, "Address to tine Submarine Technology Symposium, 13 May 1992," 40-42,
or, "Second Luncheon Address," 21-30.
88
E. CONCLUSIONS
The individual issues of submarine roles and missions, force structure, and
design are important and vital to the future of the submarine force. They are
however, simply parts of a larger issue: the justification of the submarine as an
instrument of national security for the United States. This justification is
dependent upon the submarine force changing its frame of reference in the
defense debate, participating more fully and actively in the debate, and engaging
Congress in the decision making process.
During the Cold War, defense debates were largely concerned with parochial
battles over shares of defense resources. 13 There was no need for the
justification of defense forces, so that the focus was on individual issues. Now
that the Cold War is over, the focus has changed to the justification of specific
forces. The submarine force is a common subject of this debate. This change in
focus of the defense debate requires a similar change of approach for the
submarine force. The frame of reference for the submarine force should change
from the individual issues to the contribution of individual issues to a larger
justification of the submarine's contributions to US national security. This is
necessary to restore the credibility of the submarine force and to effectively
counter arguments against the submarine in the post-Cold War world.
Once the frame of reference for the submarine force has been adjusted, it is
important that the submarine force participate fully in the ongoing defense
debate. This will require that the submarine force shed its insular and secretive
-^For recent examples of debates over single issues in the post-Cold War era, see Vice
Admiral Robert F. Dunn, "Power Projection: Back on top, but..." US Naval Institute
Proceedings, February 1991, 13; and Kevin P. Peppe, "Attack Submarines Should: Attack!
Attack! Attack!" US Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1991, 62-64.
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ways. The need for secrecy surrounding submarine operations has evaporated
with the end of the Cold War. Declassifying past submarine operations that
demonstrate the utility of the submarine in regional warfare and crises will help
to correct the misperceptions surrounding the submarine. Similarly efforts to
publicize the capabilities and missions of the submarine will help to alleviate
misperceptions and strengthen the role of the submarine in naval diplomacy. In
addition, efforts must be made to emphasize the enormous comparative
advantage that exists in submarine technology due to the demise of the Soviet
Union. This advantage has resulted in the relative invulnerability of the
submarine in regional contingencies.
Having begun to participate fully in the defense debates, it is equally vital
that the submarine force actively engage the Congress in the initial stages of the
decision making process involving the future of the submarine force. This will
ensure that Congress will make educated decisions concerning the future of
submarines, and will also serve to develop and maintain the credibility of the
submarine community in the eyes of Congress. If the submarine force fails to
include Congress in the initial development of the submarine's future, then
Congress will still affect the future of the submarine force through decisions
based not on the input of the submarine force but on open hostility to the
submarine community and with a focus on individual issues vice long term
vision.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The end of the Cold War has been the watershed event for change in the
international and national security environments. The Soviet Union no longer
exists as a tangible global threat to American national security interests. The
uncertain threat of regional crises and contingencies has replaced the fear of
global war as the basis for US defense forces. This fundamental change, as
enunciated in the National Security Strategy of the United States and the National
Military Strategy, requires a comprehensive reexamination of service strategies
and programming. Tins examination is well underway as each service struggles
to determine its contribution in the post-Cold War world.
The US Navy has outlined its vision for the future in . . . From The Sea:
Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century. This vision develops a general
framework for the contributions of naval forces to the new regional defense
strategy. What has yet to be determined is the exact contribution of each element
of US naval forces. The submarine force, in particular, is striving to effect a
smooth transition from a Cold War posture to a regional defense posture. This
transition must include the determination of roles and missions, force structure,
future submarine design, and institutional changes to support this new strategy.
Roles And Missions
The roles and missions of the submarine force must not be determined from
the perspective of rationalizing force structure, but rather from the perspective of
contributions to the new regional defense strategy. This strategy is based upon
the four foundations of forward presence, crisis response, strategic deterrence
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and defense, and reconstitution. Although these terms have been used to
describe strategy in the past, their use today is often very different.
The submarine force contributes to the national objective of forward
presence through peacetime engagement, and by enhancing the US crisis
response capability. The Navy should assume a greater share of responsibility
for forward presence due to the rapid pace of ground-based force withdrawals
and overseas base closures. With the declining numbers of ships in the Navy
and depending on policy decisions made by the naval leadership, the submarine
should be assigned a greater role in forward presence.
The submarine has significant potential as an instrument of naval diplomacy.
The submarine can be used for signaling by the United States as either an
independent platform capable of conducting cruise missile attacks, or as an
element of an even stronger naval force, such as a Maritime Action Group
(MAG), or Carrier Battle Group (CVBG). The submarine is valuable as a force
multiplier for a MAG, and offers a US-unique comparative advantage as a rapid
response-capable forward element for a crisis response force.
The "traditional" role of the forward deployed submarine to enhance crisis
response capability is being refocused from a Soviet threat to that of regional
contingencies. This provides the operational commander with additional
capabilities and significant flexibility in periods of rising tensions. The
submarine's enduring strengths make it a flexible platform capable of assuming
independent or joint roles in support of forward presence. Although the
submarine is still not viewed by many as a viable instrument of naval diplomacy,
submarines have been used by the United States in the past to send signals and
should be used extensively in the future.
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The submarine's unique and multiple capabilities make it a significant
contributor to the national objective of crisis response. The submarine has three
roles in crisis response: 1) rapid response and offense suppression, 2) joint task
force and ground support, and 3) integrated strike operations. The most
important role that submarines play in crisis response is that of rapid response
and offense suppression. The submarine can arrive on the scene of a crisis faster
than any other naval forces due to its ability to conduct sustained independent
high speed transits. The transit of a CVBG, on the other hand, is constrained by
the slowest ship in the formation and the need to conduct periodic refueling of
non-nuclear powered ships.
The ability of submarines to perform offense suppression of sea and land
based threats performs two functions for the joint task force (JTF) commander.
First, it can reduce the threat to follow-on forces by destruction or degradation of
the adversary's capabilities. Second, it forces the adversary to divert his forces
from operations against follow-on forces to operations to neutralize the US
submarine threat. The submarine is the ideal platform for these roles due to its
stealth. Its ability to remain undetected allows it to be inserted into a hostile
region without the need for significant defensive support.
The submarine's role in joint task force and ground warfare support is
complementary in nature. The submarine can be tasked with missions from
either the joint task force commander or unified commander in chief (CINC), or
the local battle group or naval expeditionary force commander. In both cases,
this support would occur in situations where follow-on forces have arrived and
established themselves in the region. Additionally, the submarine will continue
its offense suppression efforts, using its ability to operate far forward. The
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submarine's unique capabilities also provide the operational naval forces and
ground forces commanders with real-time covert intelligence that could prove
invaluable to coordination and defense of follow-on forces.
In joint operations, the submarine can simultaneously support both
defensive and offensive tasks as designated by the operational commander.
. . . From The Sea, the Navy's strategy paper, has articulated the joint missions of
joint strike, joint littoral warfare, joint surveillance, and joint SEW /intelligence.
These missions are supported by the submarine performing the fundamental
tasks of anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), strike, and
mine and anti-mine warfare as well as the supporting tasks of special warfare,
surveillance, combat search and rescue (CSAR), and intelligence collection.
The ability of the submarine to employ cruise missiles provides the
operational commander with additional flexibility and strike capability.
"Submarines will not replace traditional carrier aircraft heavy-strike ordnance,
but submarine-launched cruise missiles could be the vanguard element that
attacks air-defense, early-warning, and communications facilities to reduce the
threat against follow-on aircraft. "1 These potential roles of the submarine in
crisis response illustrate the applicability of the submarine to regional warfare
and demonstrate that the submarine is not solely an ASW weapon.
The submarine force has played a major role in nuclear deterrence, and that
role will continue. With the recent agreements on nuclear weapons between the
United States and Russia, the importance of the SSBN is growing as ICBMs are
de-MIRVed and destroyed. It could even be argued that the SSBN in this post-
'•Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, "Submarine Warfare - It's A-Changing," US Naval
Institute Proceedings, June 1992, 53.
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Cold War era could shoulder the entire burden of nuclear deterrence. This may
be an inviting alternative in a period of declining defense budgets. One role that
the submarine has played in the past appears to be changing. That role involves
the ability to employ the nuclear variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile
(TLAM-N), which was previously designed for use against the Soviet Union but
now appears to be equally well suited to deterring regional conflicts involving
weapons of mass destruction.
The role of the submarine in strategic ASW has not yet changed nor should it
as long as potentially hostile countries possess capable SSBN forces. Similarly, as
long as the United States maintains nuclear arms control agreements with other
countries, the submarine will have value as an irreplaceable national technical
means (NTM) of verification. With the exception of regional deterrence, the
submarine's roles in supporting nuclear deterrence are still largely related to
capabilities remaining in the military forces of Russia. Because of this these roles
are dependent upon the outcome of bilateral and unilateral decisions concerning
nuclear warhead numbers and deployment methods.
Despite its inability to be reconstituted within 8-10 years from a standing
start, the submarine is still a factor in the national objective of reconstitution. The
primary goal of reconstitution is to deter an emergent global threat. By
maintaining a viable submarine industrial base and maintaining our
technological advantages in undersea superiority, the submarine becomes a
significant contributor to this goal of deterrence. If deterrence fails, the
submarine will provide a means of verifying the existence of an emergent global
threat. The concept of reconstitution can be applied to submarines retired early
due to budgetary constraints. If feasible, these submarines can be mothballed
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similar to conventional ships or placed in a reserve status to reduce operating
costs. If a global US threat emerges in the future, these inactivated submarines
could be reconstituted faster than the construction of a new submarine. It is
important to note that this role has nothing to do with the former Soviet Union as
it exists today. Rather, this role deals primarily with the future opponents of the
United States. Whether or not they emerge from the remains of the Soviet Union
is irrelevant.
This discussion of new roles and missions for US submarines is important for
a number of reasons. First, it demonstrates that the notion of the submarine as
solely a Cold War weapons system is clearly flawed. The submarine is a very
effective weapons system for regional warfare and forward presence as well.
Second, the submarine is clearly not solely an ASW platform. Even during the
Cold War, the submarine was designed and developed to have multimission
capability. Articulation and demonstration of this multimission capability is vital
to ensure the proper justification of requirements for future submarine
construction.
This discussion is not meant to portray the submarine as the ultimate
weapon system for the new world order. Instead, the purpose of this thesis is to
create an outline of the multiple and various means in which the submarine can
contribute in this new international security environment. The submarine's
unique characteristics of stealth, endurance, and agility as well as its
multimission capabilities make it an important contributor to forward presence,
crisis response, deterrence, and reconstitution. Table 2 below summarizes these
contributions.
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In looking at these roles and missions for the submarine, one should realize
that the hierarchy of the four foundations of the regional defense strategy is in a
state of transition. During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence and forward
presence were the high priorities. Now, with the focus on regional warfare,
forward presence and crisis response are becoming the highest priorities. Figure
5 illustrates the new emphasis for submarine roles. As the emphasis for roles
and missions changes, this requires a reevaluation of submarine force structure
and submarine design. This ensures that they are still supporting the main focus
of submarine operations.
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Force Structure
Today, the issue of force structure in the Department of Defense is a
contentious one. The debate is ongoing not only in the Pentagon, but in the hails
of Congress as well. It is important to note that the debate over force structure
does not simply involve raw numbers of ships. It also involves the necessary
organization of the Navy to effectively utilize its diminishing assets. Efforts are
currently underway to reorganize the Navy headquarters in order to respond to
the changing national security situation. Similar efforts are being considered at
the fleet level in order to effectively integrate a smaller Navy. These efforts
should include reorganizing the submarine force into functional elements that
allow for operational specialization. This specialization will add to and
strengthen the capability of deploying battle groups by integrating submarines
into the administrative and operational organization of cruiser-destrover groups.
In addition, the ability of submarines to operate independently for fleet, JTF, and
unified CINC disposal should be maintained using the current submarine
organization.
In discussing the future size of the submarine force, the discussion should be
divided into short term and long term factors. In the short term, the concern will
be over how to effect the transition from Cold War submarine force levels to
regional defense force levels. Thus, the primary questions concern what factors
will affect the rate of reduction or glide slope of submarine force levels. The
main factors that will affect the glide slope of the submarine force in the short
term are primarily political or economic. Concerns over the submarine industrial
base and its effect on local economies in New England and Virginia will have
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some effect, however, they are not substantial in the short term due to the small
number of submarines it appears will be necessary to maintain the industrial
base (one per year).
The primary short term effect on submarine reductions will be the economic
factors associated with retiring submarines. It costs significantly more to retire a
nuclear submarine than to operate it. As a result, those desiring quick benefits
from a "peace dividend" will be required to spend more in the short term if they
attempt to retire submarines faster than currently planned. Other options
include "mothballing" submarines that have not reached end of life, or simply
tying up submarines and manning them with skeleton crews to save operating
costs. The last factor that will affect the glide slope of submarine reductions in
the short term will be the international environment. If the post-Cold War world
continues to be characterized by the absence of a global threat to the United
States, then it can be assumed that submarine reductions will continue as
planned or be accelerated.
There appear to be three main factors that will affect the ultimate levels of
the submarine force in the long term. Perhaps the most important of these is the
submarine industrial base. Ongoing studies of this issue should determine a
baseline below which submarine procurement cannot fall without affecting the
viability of the industrial base. Note that this de facto floor will be affected by the
decision to maintain either one or two submarine shipyards. A limiting factor in
long term submarine force levels will be the impact of declining resources on
both the federal budget and the defense budget. Efforts to contain a persistent
budget deficit, and consolidation of roles and missions to reduce inter-service
redundancy may contribute to limiting submarine force levels.
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The final factor affecting long term force levels will be the input from the
military, primarily based upon the requirements of the Navy and the unified
CINCs. Assuming that a global threat does not emerge to threaten US interests,
these requirements proposed by the military will probably serve as ceilings for
submarine force levels. This discussion of force size should illuminate some
important points. The most important is that both the short term and long term
factors affecting the rate of submarine force structure reduction and the ultimate
force structure level are primarily economic and beyond the control of the Navy
and the Department of Defense. This does not imply that the Navy should cease
in stating its case in the current debate, but that it be aware of these other factors
in addition to the traditional inputs for force levels provided by the military.
Future Submarine Design
The issue of submarine design is currently a hot topic due to the decision to
cancel the Seawolf submarine program. Besides the current political arguments,
submarine design is important because it reflects the long term direction of the
submarine force. Because of the rapid pace of both international and domestic
events, the issue of submarine design must be looked at from both short term
and long term perspectives.
Submarine design in the short term will be affected primarily by issues
unrelated to military utility. The primary factor affecting design will be the issue
of the submarine industrial base. The reason that the construction of the follow-
on submarine will be so closely tied to the submarine industrial base issue is the
fact that the submarine force cannot justify its current force size on existing
requirements. The industrial base issue will determine when the new submarine
must be constructed in order to maintain the viability of the industrial base. This
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time factor will determine the magnitude of change that can be included in the
new submarine design.
A second related factor will be affordability. The need to provide a
submarine that is both capable and affordable is vital to ensure that the US will
continue to field a submarine force that is as capable as the one that exists today.
A third factor is the ability of the new submarine design to incorporate changes
that increase the regional warfighting capability of the submarine. This, along
with the issue of affordability, is vital to overcoming the stigma that submarines
are too expensive and designed solely for the Cold War. A final factor in the
short term is the perceived effect of continued Seawolf production on the Russian
republic. The US cannot afford to send the wrong signal to military authorities in
Russia by continued construction of a submarine designed primarily to counter a
former-Soviet threat.
These four factors are distinct but interrelated. They reflect the short term
requirement of submarine design as that of maintaining the capability of the
submarine as a weapons system for the United States through the production of a
capable but affordable submarine that ensures the viability of the submarine
industrial base. The short term requirement is not that of maintaining submarine
force structure, which is shrinking. It is to retain a US comparative advantage.
In the long term, the approach to submarine design must make minimal
assumptions in order to deflect criticism that it is stuck in the Cold War. It must
concentrate on the areas needed to produce a regional warfighting submarine.
This includes a return to the issue of submarine propulsion. Air independent
propulsion (AIP) as a potential propulsion means for submarines should not be
ruled out in the future. The critical factors that AIP must be able to meet are
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speed, endurance, and affordability in comparison to nuclear propulsion.
Conventional or diesel propulsion is also an option, however, it has distinct
disadvantages compared to nuclear propulsion. These disadvantages would
require a fundamental adjustment of submarine roles and missions and a policy
of forward basing that appears to run contrary to current US policy.
The regional warfighting submarine must have a design emphasis on those
weapons that will be used in joint regional conflict. This translates into the
ability to carry large numbers of cruise missiles and fire them rapidly. In
addition, the need for carrying large numbers of heavy torpedoes will be
significantly reduced. One other consideration is the development of a
"proportional response" weapon capable of disabling, vice destroying, vessels
engaging in drug/weapon smuggling, minelaying, or piracy. These are
fundamental changes from past submarine design requirements.
In order for the submarine to be an effective contributor to a regional conflict,
it must be able to expand its battlespace and maintain contact with other forces.
The current battlespace of the submarine appears to be platform limited. As a
result further expansion of the battlespace requires the use of unmanned
vehicles. These vehicles can be used either underwater (UUVs) or in the air
(UAVs) in order to vastly improve the submarine's horizon and its effect on the
conflict. The need for the submarine to maintain contact with other forces is
paramount in this new emerging era of joint integrated operations. If the
regional warfighting submarine does not have the means to communicate
effectively and consistently with other forces, its major role in regional warfare
cannot be justified.
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The extent of submarine platform design appears to have reached its zenith
with the Seawolf program. The submarine's best defense is its ability to remain
undetected. As a result, the current performance characteristics of the Seawolf
should be maintained as a baseline, while research and development should
focus on the means to maintain that performance while reducing costs.
Finally, in the rush to redirect the submarine design process towards a
regional warfighting emphasis, it is important to note the historical development
of submarine design. Throughout its relatively brief history, the submarine has
been able to adapt to tremendous changes in the international environment. This
is due to its flexibility in design. While additions were made in submarine
capability, old capabilities were maintained. The result has been a multimission
capable platform that is flexible enough to respond to the demands of the post-
Cold War world.
In designing the regional warfighting submarine of the future, there are
three options to ensure that design flexibility is maintained. One is to continue
current practice and design a multipurpose platform capable of operating across
the spectrum of conflict. A second option is to design two classes of submarine,
one to deal with the specific requirements of regional warfare, the other to
maintain design flexibility and multipurpose, full warfare spectrum capability.
A third option is to apply modular construction techniques to a basic submarine
design.
The short term issue of submarine design appears to be taking center stage
due to the concerns over the submarine industrial issue. It is important that the
Navy also take a long term view of submarine design and confront the issues that
need to be faced in the transition to a regional warfighting capability. It appears
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that the Seawolf submarine program is being seen as the transition to the post-
Cold War era, and the Centurion program will be the first post-Cold War
submarine. Looking at this issue objectively, it will be very difficult for the
Centurion to completely divorce itself from many Cold War design
characteristics simply due to the short period of time that will be required for
actual construction of the first ship. Using the Centurion project as a springboard,
the Navy should begin concurrent development of a regional warfighting
submarine that will begin production in the early 21st century in order to replace
the Los Angeles class submarines as they are retired.
Changing Directions
The individual issues of submarine roles and missions, force structure, and
design are important and vital to the future of the submarine force. They are
however, simply parts of a larger issue: the justification of the submarine as an
instrument oi national security for the United States. This justification is
dependent upon the submarine force changing its frame of reference in the
defense debate, participating more fully and actively in the debate, and engaging
Congress in the decision making process.
During the Cold War, defense debates were largely concerned with parochial
battles over shares of defense resources. Now that the Cold War is over, the
focus has changed to the justification of specific forces. The submarine force is a
common subject of this debate due to its enormous procurement costs. This
change in focus of the defense debate requires a similar change of approach for
the submarine force. The frame of reference for the submarine force should
change from the individual issues to a larger justification of the submarine's
contributions to US national security. This is necessary to strengthen the
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credibility of the submarine force and to effectively counter arguments against
the submarine in the post-Cold War world.
Once the frame of reference for the submarine force has been adjusted, it is
important that the submarine force participate fully in the ongoing defense
debate. This will require that the submarine force shed its insular and secretive
ways. The need for secrecy surrounding submarine operations has evaporated
with the end of the Cold War. Declassifying past submarine operations that
demonstrate the utility of the submarine in regional warfare and crises will help
to correct the misperceptions surrounding the submarine. Similarly efforts to
publicize the capabilities and missions of the submarine will help to alleviate
misperceptions and strengthen the declarative role of the submarine in naval
diplomacy. In addition, efforts must be made to emphasize the enormous
comparative advantage that exists in submarine technology due to the demise of
the Soviet Union. This advantage has resulted in the relative invulnerability of
the US submarine in regional contingencies.
Having begun to participate fully in the defense debates, it is equally vital
that the submarine force actively engage the Congress in the initial stages of the
decision making process involving the future of the submarine force. This will
ensure that Congress will make educated decisions concerning the future of
submarines, and will also serve to develop and maintain the credibility of the
submarine community in the eyes of Congress. If the submarine force fails to
include Congress in the initial development of the submarine's future, then
Congress will still affect the future of the submarine force through decisions
based not on the input of the submarine force but on open hostility to the
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submarine community and with a focus on individual issues vice long term
vision.
A Vision for the Future
The submarine force must integrate these four issues of the future into a long
term vision. The focus of this vision should be the beginning of the next century.
This should be the period that the submarine force should target to fully
complete its transition to a regional defense force. This transition will take place
in roles and missions, force structure, submarine design, and the submarine
community as an institution.
To begin this transition, the submarine force should state its target for force
levels at the beginning of the next cenrurv. This target should include the levels
projected by the Navy and the unified CINCs that will meet requirements based
solely on roles and missions supporting forward presence and regional crisis
response. Additionally, this target should include the levels deemed necessary to
maintain the viability of the submarine industrial base assuming the maintenance
of either a single submarine shipyard or both current shipyards. The limiting
factors for this target should also be presented, including tradeoffs that may be
necessary to support other ship construction requirements or assuming various
budget levels. This target and its supporting rationale should be presented to the
Congress now to ensure that they can participate fully in the final determination
of submarine force levels in the future.
Concurrent with this presentation of a force level target, the submarine force
must present its plan for the transition of current force levels to the projected
force levels of the next century. This transition plan should include the timetable
and costs associated with the retirement of older submarines. If the target force
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level is such that it will require early retirement of Los Angeles class submarines,
the submarine force should develop plans now for either "mothbailing" these
ships or inactivating them to reduce their operating costs.
In terms of submarine design, the submarine force must make it clear that
neither the Seawolf nor the Centurion programs are necessary to support projected
submarine force levels until the next century. As a result, any decisions to build
these submarines must be clearly identified with the need to maintain the
viability of the submarine industrial base. As part of the long term vision of the
submarine force, a concurrent design project of a modular SSXN submarine
should be initiated. This submarine should be viewed as the baseline submarine
design that will provide the platform for the first true regional warfighting
submarine (SSGN), the successor to the Trident class submarine (SSBN), if
needed, and the successor to the Seawolf class submarine (SSN), if needed.
In coordination with current efforts to restructure the Atlantic and Pacific
fleet organizations, the submarine force should begin the integration of
submarines into the cruiser-destroyer groups of the surface navy to enable the
submarine to more effectively conduct its joint missions. Concurrently, the
submarine force should create submarine strike squadrons that can carry out the
independent roles and missions required of the submarine force. This
reorganization should be targeted for completion by the turn of the century in
conjunction with other transition efforts.
Finally, it is vital in the transition of the submarine force to a regional defense
posture that the submarine community shed its insular ways. Classification
requirements for submarine capabilities should be reviewed and possibly
eliminated. More attention should be paid to publicizing the contributions of the
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submarine to regional warfare including using the extensive and thoughtful
participation of the news media.
This vision of the future is already well on the way to being articulated and
implemented by the leaders of the submarine community. It is important that
the submarine community embrace this sudden and dramatic transformation
rather than resist it. The choice is clear. The submarine force can be the major
determinant of its own future, or else it can resist change and let others
determine the path of the submarine force of the future.
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